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ABSTRACT

Paradox in Shakespeare’s four tragicomedies - Pericles, Cymbeline, The Winter’s
Tale, and The Tempest - is employed to explore the human experience, a journey filled
with contradictions that thrive together.

Shakespeare’s use o f paradox takes on a

different dimension in each play and, therefore, this essay will look at the paradox, or
paradoxes, specific to individual plays. The value, then, o f paradox in Shakespeare’s
four tragicomedies is that they forge boundaries and evoke thought.
The essay is divided into the following sections: Introduction; Tragicomedy,
discusses the tragicomic form; Paradox, takes a brief look at the subject o f paradox; the
discussion of paradox in Shakespeare’s four tragicomedies is presented in The Plays; and
the Conclusion.
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Paradox in Shakespeare’s Tragicomedies
Pericles, Cymbeline, The Winter’s Tale, and The Tempest

INTRODUCTION
Shakespeare’s tragicomedies - Pericles, Cymbeline, The Winter's Tale, and The
Tempest - like most tragicomedies, combine the seriousness o f tragedy with the whimsy
of comedy, creating fertile ground for paradox. Perhaps the most well known incidence
of paradox among Shakespeare’s four tragicomedies occurs in The Winter's Tale when
the stone sculpture of Hermione comes to life and steps down from her pedestal (V.iii.98103). In this moment, the boundary between reality and appearance is blurred and the
“paradoxical blending of nature and art” (Platt 200) is in full view.
According to Giambattista Guarani, tragicomedy’s “chief Renaissance theorist”
(Foster 312), “tragicomedy is not a compound of two favole, one of which is a perfect
tragedy and the other a perfect comedy...but it is a mixture of those tragic and comic
parts which can stand together with probability” (Ristine 41).

But there is no exact

formula for the proper mixture of tragic and comic elements to make the perfect
tragicomedy. Madeleine Doran says that tragicomedy “is so protean that the writer may
sometimes doubt its entity.... Any one on the trail of the tragicomedy, therefore, is on an
uncertain quest, and must be prepared to hear, on his return, that he has got a pigeonhole
without a pigeon” (124). Michael Neill also focuses on the variable nature of the form:
“the protean qualities of this drama, the violent switches of attitude and behavior, are not

1 Unless otherwise noted, all copy texts are from The Arden Shakespeare. William Shakespeare: Pericles,
ed. Suzanne Gossett (Third Series; London: Thomson, 2004); Cymbeline, ed. J.M. Nosworthy (London:
Thomson, 1955); The Winter’s Tale, eds. Richard Proudfoot, Ann Thompson and David Scott Kastan
(1963; Third Series; London: Thomson, 2003). The Tempest, eds. Virginia Mason Vaughan and Alden T.
Vaughan (Third Series; London: Thomson, 1999).
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simply resources of theatrical expediency: they reveal the dramatists’ sense of a world
knit up of contraries, inherently unstable and liable to sudden alteration and peripety”
(321). The genre of tragicomedy, with its amorphous form, is like a paradox in that both
are hard to pin down. No two people define tragicomedy in the same way, just as no two
people assign the same meaning to Shakespearean paradox in his tragicomedies. The
idea of paradox is so unstable that when John Donne was prompted to define paradox, he
opted instead to relate what it did rather than define what it was (Colie PE 36-37). This
essay will interrogate Shakespeare’s use of paradox in his tragicomedies as a means of
exploring the human experience, a journey filled with contradictions that thrive together.
Shakespeare’s four tragicomedies are also commonly known as “romances,” but
the term “tragicomedy” is more suited to the topic o f paradox than is the phrase
“romantic story,” the history of which Madeleine Doran traces in her Endeavors o f Art
(186).

According to Doran, the romantic story “got pulled about and shaped into the

separable forms of tragedy and comedy,” meaning that it preceded the tragicomedy as
“an anomalous mixture of distinctive forms” (186). Nonetheless, Doran also establishes
a logical “kinship” between the term “tragicomedy” and “romance” by describing
tragicomedy as an “attainment of skill in manipulation of a type of story characteristic of
romantic drama” (188). While the terms “tragicomedy” and “romance” are at times used
interchangeably by some of the critics cited in this essay, the focus of this essay will be
on the term “tragicomedy” because of the inherent conflict between the genres that
compose the word.

2 The original application of the term “romance,” as applied to Pericles, Cymbeline, The Winter’s Tale, and
The Tempest, can be traced to Irish poet and critic Edward Dowden’s 1875 publication of Shakspere,
wherein he coined the term (Wallace 820n8). The derivation of Dowden’s terminology, “romances,” is
discussed in the essay section, Tragicomedy.
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A Shakespearean comedy or tragedy ends with social and political reorganization
and regeneration, but each arrives at its destination through different means. Northrup
Frye offers a sufficient characterization of what happens in comedy as well as what
happens in tragedy (.Anatomy 163-85; 206-22), but C. L. Barber and Naomi Liebler,
respectively, see these Shakespearean forms as sites of contestation and confrontation of
social and political issues. Barber says that Shakespearean comedy is distinguished by
the communal experience and observance of “periodic sports and feast days” (5), events
which he termed “saturnalian” (3).

These events were granted “temporary license, a

‘misrule’ which implied rule,” by the “Anglican and Catholic culture” (Barber 10),
thereby implying a sense of temporary disorder that is restored to order at the end of the
celebration.

Liebler says: “Thus, both comedy and tragedy are festive genres.

The

former (as Barber demonstrated) recognizes, negotiates, and celebrates the social
operations that reaffirm and revitalize social institutions, while the latter discloses the
consequence of misrecognizing or debasing those operations by diverting or disjoining
them from the structures through which a society normally derives its meaning” (8).
What differentiates one form from the other is the level o f disorder and recognition
inherent in both.

Comedy contains controlled turmoil and recognition o f social

operations while tragedy is characterized by chaos and misrecognition of social and
political institutions. These two extremes meet and interact in tragicomedy.
Part of this essay is a study o f the genre of tragicomedy, for to understand the
natural resistance between tragedy and comedy is to understand the use of paradox in
Shakespeare’s four tragicomedies.

Shakespeare’s use of paradox takes on a different

dimension in each play and, therefore, this essay will look at the paradox, or paradoxes,
specific to individual plays. The plays are analyzed in order of publication because of
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how they can feed sequentially on one another, almost as if The Tempest was the result of
three prior experiments. In Pericles, Shakespeare uses paradox to interrogate the role
history plays in defining the present, perhaps so that his audience will consider their
belief between providence and free will, and maybe to consider the premise that
patriarchal power may, in fact, be dependent on women; in Cymbeline, he uses paradox
to exhibit how opposing, irreconcilable character traits create an identity when compared
side by side; in The Winter’s Tale, there are competing images of appearance and reality
(Hermione’s descent) that demonstrate a coexistence between truth and falsehood, nature
and art; and in The Tempest, actors and audience can be interchangeable revealing a
startling similarity between fictive stage drama and real life.
This essay is divided into the following sections: Tragicomedy, discusses the
tragicomic form; Paradox, takes a brief look at the subject of paradox through the eyes of
long-noted expert Rosalie Colie and the more current scholar Peter Platt, who focuses
solely on Shakespearean paradox in his book, Shakespeare and the Culture o f Paradox;
The Plays contain the discussion of paradox in Shakespeare’s tragicomedies; and the
Conclusion.
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Tragicomedy
The term “tragic-comedy” was first used by Roman playwright Plautus in
Amphitryon, a tragicomedy “which presented gods (Jupiter and Mercury) disguised as
mortals involved in domestic intrigue, i.e., traditionally tragic personages involved in
traditionally comic affairs” (Herrick l).3 The fickle nature o f the genre is deified in the
figure of the wavering god. Charles Passage dates the original text somewhere in the
190’s B.C.E. (pref.) and links the origins of Plautus’ tragicomedy to Homer’s Iliad and
Odyssey, both of which contain a character named Amphitryon. The connection is the
contested parentage of Herakles and the potential for him to be part man, part god. Both
epics provide proof that Alkmene is his human mother, and The Iliad offers proof that the
“king of gods” (Passage 1), Zeus, was his father, but The Odyssey leaves open the
possibility that his father could have been either Zeus or the mortal Amphitryon (Passage
1-2). If Zeus was his father, Herakles would embody the conflict between a dominant
god and the dominated mortal where the tone o f conflict and the concept o f being betwixt
and between two divergent worlds are centered. In this instance, Herakles would be a
combination of god and mortal, a hybrid in much the same way a tragicomedy is a hybrid
of each genre.
Italian poet and playwright Battista Guarini is considered the force behind
tragicomedy: he transformed it into a legitimate and accepted form of the Renaissance

Now for the favor that I’ve come to ask you for,
and then I’ll tell you all about our tragedy.
- What’s wrong? Why do you frown? Because I said the play
would be a tragedy? But I’m a god - I’ll change it:
I’ll change the play from tragedy to comedy,
if that’s what you want, without a single change of lines!
Well, yes or no? would you like that? What a dunce 1 am!
As if you didn’t know what you want - and me a god!
I understand exactly what you have in mind:
I’ll scramble them and make a tragic-comedy (Passage 42)
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audience.

Doran says that Guarini “defined tragicomedy in such a way that it had a

chance to be regarded as a legitimate species distinct from comedy and tragedy, not
merely as an amorphous mixture” (192). Guarini considered tragicomedy a composite of
tragedy and comedy:
From the one it takes the noble characters, not the action, the story,
probable but invented, the emotions, stirred but tempered, the delight, not
the sadness, the danger, not the death; from the other, the decorous mirth,
the sober gentleness, the invented plot, the happy change, and above all
the comic order.

(Ristine 36-37)

The first reference is to tragedy where emotions are tempered and death is merely a
threat.

The second reference, comedy, substitutes invented plot for tragic action and

happy change for death. Not all observers of the new form were supportive of the new
genre. Guarini’s IIpastor fido (circa 1589), a play with “a most ingeniously constructed
plot,” of “interminable length” with “various crossed love difficulties,” (Ristine 34)
sparked its own controversy of tragicomic theory (Lyne 91). Lyne and Ristine describe
the debate between Guarini and Giasone de Nores, a “Paduan professor of moral
philosophy,” who characterized tragicomedy as a “monstrous and disproportionate
composition” (Ristine 35). Guarini and his II Pastor Fido may have been the forces
which ignited the tragicomedy movement in 1589, but the team of Beaumont and
Fletcher are responsible for perfecting the renaissance form in the early seventeenth
century (Doran 186; Ristine 81, 87). Shakespeare’s tragedies and comedies may have
had a significant influence on this “distinguishable Fletcherian form” (Doran 188), but
his plays, and the plays of his contemporaries such as Chapman, Dekker, and Marston
(Doran 210), were not of the same measure. According to Doran, typical Renaissance
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tragicomic form, usually associated with Beaumont and Fletcher, was characterized by
the “high rank of the principal characters, in certain solemnity of sentiment, and in clever
management of plot so that a surprise recognition or change o f heart brings about a
dramatic reversal from extreme peril to good fortune” (186-87), and also being a mixture
of “tragic and comic episodes...of social classes” and “a combination of the serious
action of tragedy with the happy ending of comedy” (193).
There is no single description of tragicomedy that fits every Shakespearean
tragicomedy, but Ristine provides a comprehensive description o f the genre.

Ristine

refers specifically to the plays of the Beaumont and Fletcher team and Davenant. The
former were contemporaries and successors of Shakespeare and the latter wrote in the
subsequent Caroline period (139), but the description applies well to the four
tragicomedies:
Perhaps the first impression gained from reading any such group o f plays
is one of startling unreality. The reader is transported to a no man’s land,
beyond the ken of human experience, where men take on superhuman
characteristics, where strange events happen, and imaginary history is
made and unmade in the twinkling of an eye. The checkered fortunes of
monarchs, generals, and lords and ladies of high degree engross his chief
attention; war, usurpation, rebellion - actual or imminent - furnish a
subordinate interest; while a comic touch or sub-plot is the diverting
accompaniment of the romantic action. Love o f some sort is the motive
force; intrigue is rife; the darkest villany is contrasted with the noblest and
most exalted virtue. In the course of an action teeming with incident and
excitement, and in which the characters are enmeshed in a web of
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disastrous complications, reverse and surprise succeed each other with a
lighting rapidity, and the outcome trembles in the balance.

But final

disaster is ingeniously averted. The necessary dei ex machina descend in
the nick of time: wrongs are righted, wounds healed, reconciliation sets in,
penitent villany is forgiven, and the happy ending made complete.
(Ristine xiii)
Unreal experiences, such as “startling unreality,” are matched with real life events like
“war” and “rebellion.”

These types of pairings set the stage for paradox.

Ristine’s

definition describes the individual elements of tragicomedy, but Northrup Frye offers up
a meaning that characterizes its structure.
In Anatomy o f Criticism, Northrop Frye argues that “Romance, like comedy, has
six isolatable phases, and as it moves from the tragic to the comic area, the first three are
parallel to first three phases of tragedy and the second three to the second three phases of
comedy” (198). The three tragic conventions are the “birth of the hero,” the “innocent
youth of the hero,” and the hero’s quest while the three comic conventions are the
“maintaining of the integrity of the innocent world against the assault of experience,” a
“reflective, idyllic view of experience from above,” and the “end o f a movement from
active to contemplative adventure” (198-202).

When we look more closely at the

clashing elements of tragedy and comedy in the tragicomedies, we will see that Frye’s
approach serves as a sound, general guide, but that Shakespeare’s plays frequently divert
from the template Frye defined.

Hunter’s definition of romance, “The romance is a

journey which ends in lovers meeting, but necessary preludes to the triumph of love are
the separations and temptations which test its strength” (65), nicely captures the arc
between tragedy and comedy: “Shakespeare imposes on the disordered series o f thrilling
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adventures that constitute actions of such plays as Pericles, a meaningful pattern of sin,
repentance, and forgiveness” (141). The structural settings offered by Frye and Hunter,
where the hero is tested during his journey, are the framework within which the paradox
of tragicomedy evolve.
Orgel tells us that literary critic Dowden was the first to apply the term “romance”
to this body of Shakespeare’s work, providing this description:
There is a romantic element about these plays. In all there is the same
romantic incident of lost children recovered by those to whom they are
dear - the daughters of Pericles and Leontes, the sons of Cymbeline and
Alonso.

In all there is a beautiful romantic background o f sea or

mountain. The dramas have a grave beauty, a sweet serenity, which seem
to render the name ‘comedies’ inappropriate; we may smile tenderly, but
we never laugh loudly, as we read them. Let us, then, name this group
consisting of four plays, Romances. (Tempest 4n3)
Dowden does not identify the tragic component of romance. However, just as one may
“never laugh loudly” as one might in a comedy, the audience will know of the death of
minor characters, such as in Pericles (II.0.35-36), but never quite grieve for the lost souls
of romance in the same way they might for the fallen hero of tragedy.
Perhaps the tragicomedy/romance explanation that best captures this effect is that
offered by Beaumont and Fletcher: “A tragie-comedie is not so called in respect of mirth
and killing, but in respect it wants death, which is inough to make it no tragedie, yet
brings some neer it, which is inough to make it no comedie” (Bowers 3:497).
Tragicomedy explores binary pairings and shows us that, not only do they coexist, but
that there is a necessary mutual dependence.

One cannot exist without the other.
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However, Giasone de Nores, the Paduan professor who argued with Guarini over the
“preposterous nature of tragicomedy” (Ristine 35), might have had a problem with
Beaumont and Fletcher’s characterization of tragicomedy as a genre which “wants
death.” His argument was that death is terrifying and, if death is merely a danger, then
there is no terror. Ristine characterizes the de Nores’ argument as a paradox, “for ‘How,’
he asks, ‘can there be danger of death unless there is terror’” (37). This type o f argument
is characteristic of paradox in tragicomedy.

Doran characterizes tragicomedy with

phrases like “softening of both tragic and comic attitudes,” a “crumbling of the edges”
(187), and a “blending of tones” (203) each of which recalls Greenblatt’s observation that
Shakespeare “learned that the boundary between comedy and tragedy is surprisingly
porous” (34) and echoing an observation made by Norman Rabkin regarding the
indistinct line between nature and art (134). Tragicomedy, a form unto itself, yet highly
reflective of tragedy and comedy, is inherently contradictory and contains boundary
crossings, a topic discussed further in Part II.
The journey of tragicomedy in the first part of a play is a slowly building
crescendo toward tragedy and, in the latter part, an urge toward comedy, neither o f which
fully realizes their generic mission, only to come together in their opposition to create the
unique and undefined experience of romance. This bumping o f binaries creates the space
in which characters and communities are plunged into turmoil, a place where change
occurs and boundaries are breached, resulting in some type o f transformation.

The

colliding of divergent ideas and principles is at the heart of tragicomedy and the dramatic
form that Shakespeare employs in Pericles, Cymbeline, The Winter's Tale, and The
Tempest to explore the paradoxical workings of the total human experience.
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Paradox
A paradox, in its simplest form, is a contradictory statement that challenges
convention.

There are more comprehensive definitions,4 but their essence lies in the

inherent conflict they present and the argument that they frequently leave unresolved.
Paradoxes work by pairing differing opinions against established doctrine. The result of
this clash may reinforce existing policy, replace it with new opinion, or spark further
debate,

but in any event the juxtaposition exposes contrary

arguments that,

incomprehensibly at times, exist side by side. The value, then, in the exercise o f paradox
is the on-going challenge it expresses to the status quo.
Cicero’s Paradoxa stoicorum contains one of the earliest collections o f paradoxes
wherein the Roman philosopher and statesman describes the astonishing effect and
polarizing bias of paradox: “These doctrines are surprising, and they run counter to
universal opinion” (Platt 2). The word “paradox” is a combination of the Greek words
“para,” meaning “by the side of, beside,”5 and “doxy,” meaning “opinion.”6 When the
two are combined into the word “paradoxy,” or paradox, then they can be read as “by the
side of opinion” or “beside opinion,” which, in either case, imparts the sense o f two
divergent arguments standing in the same space.
John Donne, noted for his use of paradox, ended his sonnet “Death, Be Not
Proud“ with a paradox: “One short sleepe past, wee wake eternally, / And death shall be

4 “Paradox.” Def. la. “A statement or tenet contrary to received opinion or belief, esp. one that is difficult
to believe”; Def. 2a. “An apparently absurd or self-contradictory statement or proposition, or a strongly
counter-intuitive one, which investigation, analysis, or explanation may nevertheless prove to be wellfounded or true” (Note that definitions la and 2a are, themselves, opposed. The first references something
that “is difficult to believe” and the second something that is “well-founded or true”); Def. 2b. “A
proposition or statement that is (taken to be) actually self-contradictory, absurd, or intrinsically
unreasonable.” Oxford English Dictionary Online, <www.oed.com>; “A paradox is a statement which
seems on its face to be self-contradictory or absurd, yet turns out to have a valid meaning.” (Abrams 119).
5 “Para-.” Def. 10. Etymology. OED. <www.oed.com>.
6
“Doxy.” Def. 2. OED. <www.oed.com>.
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no more, Death, thou shalt die” (Donne 342). The poem is a religious reference to the
pleasure of eternal life which must, in turn, mean the death of death. But how can death
die? If it dies, doesn’t death survive? Death seems to live and die in this poem. Rosalie
Colie said that, “To define paradox is, by definition, a self-defeating enterprise,” citing
Donne’s letter to a friend, Sir Henry Wotton according to Platt (12n44), who merely “told
what they did, without seeking to describe, define, delimit, or determine the form in
general” (39). O f the complex, contradictory nature and sometime disheartening sense of
paradox, Donne wrote:
Only in obedience I send you some of my paradoxes; I love you and
myself and them too well to send them willingly for they carry with them
a confession of their lightnes. and your trouble and my shame, but indeed
they were made rather to deceave tyme then her daughter truth: although
they have been written in an age when any thing is strong enough to
overthrow her: if they make you to find better reasons against them, they
do their office: for they are but swaggerers: quiet enough if you resist
them, if perchaunce they be pretyly guilt, that is there best for they are not
hatcht: they are rather alarums to truth her then enemies: and they have
only this advantadg to scape from being cald ill things that they are no
things; therefore take heed of allowing any of them least you make
another.

(Colie PE 36-37)

By characterizing paradox as something which carries “lightnes” and being “no thing,”
while simultaneously admitting that paradoxes “make you to find better reasons against
them” and that “they are rather alarums to truth her then enemies,” Donne defines
paradox with a paradox. There is an inherent contradiction against finding truth out of
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nothing. A. E. Malloch writes that paradoxes “tease the intellect as an optical illusion
teases

the

eye,” tricking

the

mind

into

a false

recognition,

and

that “the

paradoxist... makes something out o f nothing, giving utterance to an argument that is not
there” (193). But perhaps Donne and Malloch are being agile, maybe even deceptive,
when they characterize paradox as “no things” or as “nothing” since one of the reasons to
engage in paradox is the potential to create something new within that space between two
opposing sides.
One of the more noted paradoxes is the Liar paradox: “Epimenides the Cretan
said, ‘All Cretans are Liars’” (Colie PE 6). The paradox works only if Epimenides is
Cretan, otherwise the statement is merely an accusation. Colie explains the paradox: “If
he told the truth, then his statement is a lie, and so he didn’t tell the truth; if he lied, then
his statement is true, but he did not lie. In terms o f logic and of language the statement is
a perfect self-contradiction, a perfect equivocation” {PE 6).

Likewise, a failure to

commit would be another paradox wherein the not committing is actually a commitment
(Colie PE 38).

Wavering paradox also can provide cover to politicians who want to

avoid alienating any part of an electorate by siding against none. Platt establishes this
notion, in part, as one of his guiding principles of paradox: “Paradox implies a deferral of
commitment and therefore provides safety in controversial issues, especially in political
and religious arenas” (13). While paradox can have this paralyzing effect, it seems that it
is more important to raise issues, a Shakespearean commonplace, than to ignore them.
Another example of paradox is Colie’s observation of a mirror:
The psychological effect of mirrors is that they both confirm and question
individual identity - confirm by splitting the mirrored viewer into observer
and observed, giving him the opportunity to view himself objectively, as
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other people do; question, by repeating him as if her were simply an
object, not “himself,” as he surely “knows” himself to be, by repeating
himself as if he were not (as his inmost self insists that he is) unique.
(355-56)
The reflective, repeating image of the mirror creates the paradox because identity is both
confirmed and questioned.
If paradox contains two divergent sides, than those sides must each have
boundaries, boundaries that in paradox are crossed and, in doing so, ignite contradiction.
Colie recognizes the significance of the in-between spaces o f paradox, and their implied
boundaries: “paradoxes play back and forth across terminal and categorical boundaries that is, they play with human understanding, that most serious of all human activities”
(Colie Paradoxia 7). Boundary crossing and conflict are at the heart of Victor Turner’s
liminal thesis. According to Turner, “Liminal entities are neither here nor there; they are
betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and
ceremonial” (95). The root of Turner’s “liminality” is derived from Van Gennep’s view
on rites de passage: “Van Gennep has shown that all rites of passage or ‘transition’ are
marked by three phases: separation, margin (or limen, signifying ‘threshold" in Latin),
and aggregation” (Turner 94).

Van Gennep’s rites de passage were predicated on

individual transition, such as “boundary-crossings, changes in social status, seasonal and
other kinds of temporal change” but, importantly, Turner “expanded his discussion to
‘ritualistic’ action as distinct from ritual per se,” imbricating the concept o f liminality on
the individual as well as on society (Liebler 117-18). Turner also regarded liminality “as
a time and place of withdrawal from normal modes of social action” (167). Platt equates
Turner’s “withdrawal from normal modes of social action” with “drama” (142), allowing
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an audience “a period of scrutinization of the central values and axioms of the culture in
which it occurs” (Turner 167).
Thinking about paradox as a situational oxymoron7 is a concise way to grasp such
a circular concept.
Dream.

o

Shakespeare provides his own example in A Midsummer N ig h t’s

After offering Theseus three arguably tragic wedding masques, Philostrate

proposes a masque that introduces the ideas of paradox and tragicomedy:
4A tedious brief scene o f young Pyramus
And his love Thisbe, a very tragical mirth’?
Merry and tragical? Tedious and brief?
That is hot ice, and wondrous strange snow!
How shall we find the concord of this discord?
(V.i.56-60)
“Tragical mirth” is very close to word “tragicomedy” in name and certainly conveys its
inherent sense of conflict.

Shakespeare couldn’t be more literal in demonstrating

paradox: merriment is opposite tragic; something brief cannot be tedious; ice is cold, not
hot; and how can concord be a part of discord? Antithetical pairings and an inability to
resolve contradiction are at the core of tragicomedy, and the inclusion o f such a reference
in A Midsummer N ight’s Dream, a comedy, would seem to set the stage for the later four
tragicomedies more than a decade later.
Platt specifically discusses the culture o f Shakespearean paradox in his book,
Shakespeare and the Culture o f Paradox, and defines paradox in the context of the stage

7 Prof. Naomi Liebler made this observation during a seminar on Shakespearean tragedy at Montclair
State University (January 25, 2005). Abrams also made a connection between “paradox” and “oxymoron”:
“If the paradoxical utterance combines two terms that in ordinary usage are contraries, it is called an
oxymoron; an example is Tennyson’s ‘(9 Death in life, the days that are no more’”(l 19).
8 William Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, ed. Harold F. Brooks (The Arden Shakespeare
Second Series; London: Thomson, 1979).
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as “a discourse in which opposites can coexist and perspectives can be altered” in which
an audience “would be forced, if only briefly, to reconsider accepted opinions, beliefs,
truths” (1).

This means that paradox, like tragicomedy, carries with it an air of

subversion, an apt notion for a concept of opposites.

Further, Platt explains that

Renaissance paradox “startles its ‘audience’ into marvel and amazement; it contains
opposites without necessarily resolving them; and it challenges convention and
commonly held opinions, often reshaping thought in the process” (8). And, according to
Stephen Orgel, the “Renaissance audience tolerated, and indeed courted, a much higher
degree of ambiguity and opacity than we do” (Platt 40).

Neill makes a related

observation: “the Renaissance fascination with paradox, even in its more frivolous
expressions, was more than a trick o f style: it corresponded to whole way of thinking
about the world” (320). These mixed mode, tragic-comic plays are, by definition, going
to create problems for an audience looking for the clear focus of one genre or another
because they are, in the end, indeterminate - which may be Shakespeare’s point. He’s
not providing answers, he’s provoking thought which can, but may not be, in line with
common consideration.

These plays can be considered learning tools of life and an

experience that compels their audiences to exercise judgment. Gabriel Harvey “saw the
instructional and intellectual value of the paradox:”
I would vppon mine owne charges, trauaile into any parte of Europe, to
heare some pregnant Paradoxes, and certaine singular questions in the
highest professions of learning, in Physick, in Law, in Diuinity, effectually
and thoroughly disputed pro, & contra.

(Platt 25)

Harvey sought an education through the “pregnant Paradoxes” and their rich and fertile
grounds of contradiction. The very image of fertility should direct our attention toward
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the creation of something new, even though it may be hard to comprehend, as Donne and
Malloch had suggested, that there is a birth from nothing.
Platt sees an instructional value of Shakespearean paradox when he says that the
“Shakespearean theater...does not define thought but causes thinking” (203) and he is
right when he notes that “something important happens in the in-between space of
paradox” (205) because the outcome of paradox is not concrete resolution, but the
coexistence of two divergent concepts.

Platt’s sentiment seems to be a modem day

expression of the same didactic aim of Shakespearean drama that Edward Dowden wrote
about in 1875: “Shakspere does not supply us with a doctrine, with an interpretation, with
a revelation.

What he brings to us, is this - to each one, courage, and energy, and

strength, to dedicate himself and his work to that, - whatever it be, - which life has
revealed to him as best, and highest, and most real” (430). The unknown associated with
“whatever it be” carries with it potential threat and, as Brian Vickers said, “the threat of
the paradox is that it could come true” (307).

Paradoxes pique our curiosity while

simultaneously making us uncomfortable because they can be subversive.

The

combination of tragic and comic elements in tragicomedy serves as an agitating force that
allows Shakespeare to create paradox in his four tragicomic plays.
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The Plays
Pericles
Shakespeare’s first tragicomic play, Pericles, evokes the past to show the value of
history to the present; it charges the audience to consider the difference between
providence and man's exercise of free will; and it forces us to question the legitimacy o f
patriarchal power by demonstrating that that power may be dependent on the authority of
women.
Ancient Gower returns from the dead “To sing a song that old was sung” (I.i.l),
“To glad your ear and please your eyes” (I.i.4) and his “purchase is to make men
glorious” (I.i.9). The “startling unreality” (Ristine xiii) of Gower’s return from the dead
signals that we are immersed in tragicomedy and that we can expect opposition and
contradiction. Indeed, we are not disappointed; no sooner has Gower set the stage for
festive restoration (I.i.8) than he begins the gloomy tale of incest in Antioch, hardly
making “men glorious.” The play opens with a violation of kinship and the incestuous
father-daughter relationship between Antiochus and his unnamed daughter.

Once

Pericles discovers the meaning of Antiochus’ not so cryptic riddle, he is forced to flee
Antioch in order to save his life and the future of his kingdom, Tyre. As noted by Jeanie
Moore: “Like most romances, Pericles centers on a royal family in which the desire for
children becomes and imperative dynastic need” (36). An improper familial relationship
is the initial, impelling force that motivates the journey o f Pericles in which its
protagonist searches for a bride who can provide offspring and assure his royal lineage
and the future of his kingdom. But first, Shakespeare creates a delicate, tenuous link
between Pericles and Antiochus by allowing Pericles to nudge up against thoughts of
incest when he says, “All love the womb that their first being bred” (Li. 108). The general
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sentiment of this line is that all parents love their children, but it is not beyond the ken to
conclude that Pericles may be concerned with his own incestuous thoughts given the
context in which he makes this statement (Gossett 188nl08). At this moment, Pericles
may fear his own buried and unknown darkness more than the prospect of death. We are
forced to consider if “the darkest villany” has been contrasted with “the noblest and most
exalted virtue” (Ristine xiii), or are they in closer proximity to one and other than comfort
would allow? Is Pericles in danger of crossing the boundary over-stepped by Antiochus?
The ongoing incest between Antiochus and his daughter is depraved, but it also
endangers the continuance of the government of Antioch: “The physical violation of a
daughter is patriarchal power in a most abusive form, the abuse is the very act which
destroys the patriarchy....W hen Antiochus keeps his daughter to himself, killing all her
suitors, he eliminates the possibility of his own posterity” and his own “legitimate
succession” (J. Moore 37).

The dynastic goals of Pericles seem purer than those of

Antiochus, but one cannot ignore these darker signals.

Gower’s “purchase” at the

beginning was to make the image of man shine, but his story o f Antiochus did the exact
opposite and it causes the audience to question his veracity. Perhaps this is a thread
which Shakespeare borrowed from Plutarch’s “The Life o f Pericles” where Plutarch
wrote about how the distance of time can obscure the truth: “considering long processe of
time, doth utterly obscure the trothe of matters, done in former times” (20). Since Gower
represents the past in Pericles, the audience has a right to exercise caution and always
question history. This makes Gower central to our first paradox, the value of history to
the present, and the first contradiction this essay will examine in Pericles.
Richard Hillman argues that Shakespeare adapted John Gower’s Confessio
Amantis for Pericles calling Shakespeare’s use of Gower’s name “the most sustained
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literary allusion to be found in Shakespeare” (428). John Gower was “the widely read
and greatly admired figure who was part of a living tradition of English poetry” (Hillman
427) and, as such, would have lent some level o f authority to his narrating namesake and
some inclusion of the past into the play. Confessio is a poem in which the character
Genius, a priest, “in his role as confessor, helps to restore the afflicted Amans-Gower to
spiritual equilibrium,” a tale concerned with “what is natural love and with the proper
response to adverse fortune” (Hillman 428), topics which are examined in Pericles.
Hillman concludes that Shakespeare used Gower “not only as mouthpiece but also as
muse” (437).

David Hoeniger describes the line narrated by Gower, “Et bonum quo

antiquius eo melius” (I.i. 10), which means “the older a good thing is, the better” (Gossett
172nl0), as a phrase which “confirms that the story too is antique” arguing: “We gather
that the very idea of reviving the medieval poet on the stage and having him present his
own ancient story was meant to appeal to an audience that had developed a liking of
things old-fashioned and antiquarian” (464).

Gower’s qualified presence introduces a

sense of history to the play, but his role must be more than a mere sentimental inclusion.
Amelia Zurcher discusses a “growth of antiquarianism in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries” and argues that The Winter’s Tale and Pericles “are deeply
concerned with the approach that a contemporary interpretive community should take to
accounts of the past, by which I mean accounts both about and from the past” (904). And
by taking account of the past, communities can find instructive value, or utility, in the
lessons of history. Quoting Nietzsche, Zurcher discusses two closely related types of
history, monumental and exemplar, that bring models or examples from history for the
benefit of the present (906-08). Archetypes that complement modern civilization have
utility and are a brought forth presumably for their positive influence on the present.
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However, reaching back into history can connote failure in the present or a “disregard for
the present, which must, by definition, be a denial of current failures” (Zurcher 907).
Nonetheless, while one can interpret a return to the past as a means of escaping the
present, it seems more logical that one would look to the past to learn from the lessons of
history to help guide modern concerns.

There is nothing wrong with looking to

experience to help guide the present and it would seem prudent to do so in order to keep
the present on a healthy track. The “disregard” and “denial” o f situated social or political
doctrine or government implies a level of subversion, but it can also be seen as the
location where change can occur. And change is vital to the long term survival of a
community. The mere presence of Gower is one of the reasons Zurcher says Pericles
“calls attention repeatedly to its source’s remoteness in time and to its respect o f that
remoteness” (917). Further, when Pericles becomes indebted to the fishermen who return
his father’s armor (Il.i.l 12-62), an emblematic return of his past, Zurcher suggests that
the “debt left hanging functions...as a resistance to the relationship the play establishes
between the present and the past” (924). On the contrary, the armor seems to connect
Pericles to his father rather than distance the two.

Zurcher calls this connection a

“resistance," but the acquisition of the armor and the subsequent debt facilitates Pericles’
purpose of procuring a bride, offering a solution, not impedance.

But to Zurcher,

“Pericles rejects utility entirely” (922) because incest is regressive and isolates the
present from the past because of its degenerative effect: “Incest...stands for a corrupted
return to origins, in which instead of moving forward in history the daughter regresses to
become her mother” (918). Zurcher may be correct if we think strictly in terms of the
effect that incest has on the people of Antioch, but these are the elements that Pericles
seems to resist. While Pericles may have had latent thoughts of incest, he does not act on
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them, and his family and realm end the play intact.

The same cannot be said for

Antiochus, his unnamed daughter, and the people of Antioch. This would be progressive
for Tyre.
So what evidence does the play offer regarding whether or not history provides
utilitarian value to the present?

Kenneth Semon writes, echoing Nietzsche in effect,

“Gower suggests that man can profit from the telling of old tales” (92) presumably
because they are “restoratives” (I.i.8), but Zurcher observes that the “characters do not
seem educated by their travail” (918), that Pericles “obdurately resists presence in favor
of a preference for what is gone” (924). Gower suggests that we should “hear an old man
sing” (I.i. 13) and begs that we “Pardon old Gower” (II.0.40), indicating that he is aware
of his anachronistic presence, yet nonetheless guides the action o f the play. Taken at face
value, “old” refers to Gower’s age, but his presence does bring history into the fore. He
is not only a narrator but his pedigree also makes him an experienced, trusted guide to the
audience. His trustworthy authority gives the audience a sense of comfort, but we cannot
forget his opening contradiction in which his intent is to make “men glorious” (I.i.9) by
telling a tale of incest. Nonetheless, what Gower is to the audience is what the parallel
“ancient substitute” (V.iii.51) Helicanus is to Pericles, a trusted and experienced model
on whom he can rely, a fact that Pericles himself expresses: “Fit counselor and servant
for a prince, / Who by thy wisdom makes a prince thy servant” (I.ii.61-62). The role
reversal of the servant-prince inversion between Pericles and Helicanus foreshadows the
male-female role reversal between Pericles and Marina. Helicanus implores the Lords to
“give experience tongue” (I.ii.36) which can mean that they should let Pericles speak of
his encounter with Antiochus. In the alternative, and what speaks more to the experience
that can come with age, the phrase may suggest that the Lords should let Helicanus speak
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from his experience.

His ensuing speech (I.ii.36-46) argues against the dangers of

flattery in favor of the substance of truth. His honesty borders on insubordination in an
exchange with Pericles (I.ii.47-54), prompting Pericles to rhetorically ask: “Thou
knowest I have power / To take thy life from thee” (I.ii.55), to which Helicanus humbly
and loyally responds: “I have ground the axe myself; / Do but you strike the blow”
(I.ii.56-57) offering his life in service of his king rather than trying to preserve himself.
Trusted Gower lends his credibility to the character of Helicanus when he summarizes in
the Epilogue that which we have learned in the five acts of the play: “In Helicanus may
you well descry / A figure of truth, of faith, o f loyalty” (7-8). Helicanus is an example of
Zurcher’s discussion of the Renaissance debate of Stoic theory where the “collective
will” is more important than “self-interest” (910), making Pericles a play set in the
present but which longs for the past at a time when community mattered more than self
interest.

Comparing Pericles to Helicanus contrasts youth and inexperience against

maturity and experience. The wisdom and sophistication o f Helicanus is the star toward
which Pericles navigates.

The audience sees some evidence of Gower’s “glorious”

(1.0.9) man in the specter of Pericles’ father who “in that glory once he was, / Had princes
sit like stars about his throne, / And he the sun for them to reverence” (II.iii.37-39).
Pericles may have his own father as an historic role model, in addition to Helicanus, but
even by his own admission, Pericles is inconsequential compared to him, “Where now his
son’s like a glow-worm in the night, / The which hath fire in darkness, none in the light”
(II.iii.42-43). When Pericles admits that he does not compare to his father, he subverts
his own authority as prince and calls conspicuous attention to the failure of the past to be
of value to the present.

Of course, his successful journey overturns this notion and

demonstrates that looking to the past has value to the present. However, measuring up to
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the standard of his elders is only part of his quest, a quest over which he seems to have
only minor control, and it is the level o f control over one’s destiny that is questioned
throughout Pericles’ journey.
The second paradox of Pericles is the intervention of providence versus the
exercise of man’s free will. One can argue that, in Pericles, Shakespeare puts on display
the affiliation between man’s free will and divine intervention perhaps because it may
have resonated with the audience of his day. A conflict within the church gave rise to the
Protestant movement away from the Catholic religion. Central to this debate was the
means by which man recovered from his fall from God’s grace; was it by his own efforts
or through God’s salvation?9 Dennis Taylor observes that “‘Catholic values of the
scared...the ritual, the communal, give way, in a ‘cascade o f cultural destruction’ to the
‘Protestant values of the individual, the critical mind, the subjective’” (Shuger 557) (that
is the same perspective voiced earlier by Zurcher when she discussed the emphasis of the
individual over the group.)

The long, convoluted journey of Pericles places him in

situations where he is the agent of his own destiny. First, Pericles searches for a bride to
create a family that will assure his lineage and, in theory, secure the future political
stability of Tyre by eliminating any succession debate. He fears Antiochus, but in the
height of his anxiety, he still commands his subjects: “All leave us else, but let your cares
o’erlook / What shipping and what lading’s in our haven” (I.ii.47-48), meaning he knows
that the commerce of his realm must continue despite his predicament. He flees to Tarsus

9 A full discussion of Christianity, Protestantism, and the Reformation is beyond the scope of this essay,
but the following sources were used to develop this perspective: (i) Diarmaid MacCulloch, The
Reformation (New York: Viking, 2003) 104-06; (ii) Hans J. Hillerbrand, The Division o f Christendom,
Christianity in the Sixteenth Century (Louisville: Westminster John Knox P, 2007) 13-14; and (iii) Louis
Montrose, The Purpose o f Playing: Shakespeare and the Cultural Politics o f the Elizabethan Theatre
(Chicago: Chicago UP, 1996) 58-59.

Gilson 25

in order to deflect the wrath of Antiochus away from Tyre and, while his leaving can also
/

be viewed as an act of self-preservation, the delivery o f grain to Tarsus saves a starving
community (I.iv.83-94). Pericles will stand up to Simonides when he accuses Pericles of
bewitching Thaisa (II.v.48), praising Pericles in an aside, “Now by the gods I do applaud
his courage” (II.v.56). These acts are proactive, because Pericles initiates them o f his
own accord, but there is little like evidence throughout the play until we consider the
characters of Cerimon and Marina.
Pericles has been an agency of his own destiny, but he is also quite often under
the influence of others, or acts in response to the action of others.

He expresses his

helplessness in the shadow of the powerful Antiochus: “The great Antiochus, / ‘Gainst
whom I am too little to contend, / Since he’s so great can make his will his act” (I.ii.lb18).

Cleon echoes the same sense of vulnerability as Pericles approaches Tarsus:

“Welcome is peace, if he on peace consist, / If wars, we are unable to resist” (I.iv.81-82).
Pericles may be controlled by the will o f Antiochus, but Cleon is just as susceptible to the
will of Pericles. On the one hand, Pericles is passive, and on the other, he is active.
Shakespeare embodies the providence-free will paradox in his title character. Running
away is Helicanus’ idea: “Therefore, my lord, go travel for a while” (I.ii. 104), which may
divert Antiochus’ attention away from Tyre, or it may not. If it does not, leaving Tyre in
its time of need may seem less than noble if the nation is sacked while its ruler is hiding
in a foreign country. Pericles’ fate also is frequently controlled by fortune or the gods:
Pericles “By waves from coast to coast is tossed” (II.0.34) until Fortune “tired with doing
bad, / Threw him ashore to give him glad” (II.0.37-38); on their journey from Pentapolis
to Tyre, the sailing party’s “vessel shakes / On Neptune’s billow” (III.0.44-45) prompting
Pericles to plea to Neptune: “The god of this great vast, rebuke these surges / Which was
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both heaven and hell, and thou that hast / Upon the winds command, bind them in brass, /
Having called them from the deep’’ (III.i.1-4); “Pericles / Is now again thwarting the
wayward seas” (IV.iv.9-10) on his voyage from Tyre to Tarsus which portends the bad
news he will receive on his arrival; leaving Tarsus, Pericles “bears / A tempest which his
mortal vessel tears, / And yet he rides it out” (IV.iv.29-31). Antiochus, fortune, and the
gods have determined, to a large extent, what happens to Pericles.
Pericles has reason to be torn between his belief in his own free will and the
intervention of providence. He realizes that he is a pawn in the world, but he also seems
to believe that he might just have a little control over his own fortune. He tells the three
Fishermen of Pentapolis that he is “A man, whom both the waters and the wind / In that
vast tennis-court hath made the ball / For them to play upon” (II.i.58-60) yet, this same
fortune also seems to cede some control when it delivers the armour o f Pericles’ father
from the perilous sea: “Thanks, Fortune, yet, that after all thy crosses / Thou givest me
somewhat to repair m yself’ (Il.i.l 17-18). This line melds the paradoxical pairing of an
omnipotent force, or god, together with the idea o f control over one’s own fate, issues at
the heart of the sixteenth-century Reformation. Even Calvin, who preached the austere
“powerless depravity of human action and will before the reign of grace,” realized what a
difficult standard that was and would occasionally “generate ambiguity or imprecision”
(Finkelstein 103) in his writing to relieve some pressure from this strict interpretation.
When Shakespeare allows Pericles to “repair” himself (Il.i.l 17), his free human
will is exercised within the confines o f the will of the gods and divine grace “without
which human effort was useless” (Hillerbrand 13). A subtle example of these coexistent,
if not equal, wills is witnessed in the tournament scene when Pericles enters: “The sixth
Knight Pericles, passes in rusty armour with bases, and unaccompanied’ (II.ii.38sd).
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Pericles enters alone, whereas the other five contestants are attended by squires, outfitted
in “rusty armour,” presenting the figure o f an isolated and forsaken individual, one who
stands alone but in control of his own actions, however lowly.

But this sad-looking

knight has a “graceful courtesy” (II.ii.40) in presenting Thaisa with “A withered branch
that’s only green at top, / The motto, In hoc spe vzvo” (II.ii.41-42) meaning “In this hope
I live” (II.ii.42n). Pericles has a self-contained grace that is linked with the “hope” of
winning over Thaisa. The use of “hope” implies some positive expectation of the future
but not within the control of the person who has this hope. If one is not in control, than
one’s fate lies in the hands of another.
The cross of providence and human agency are not solely embodied in the Prince
of Tyre. Finkelstein notes that “The most forceful assertions o f human agency in the play
seem performed in its last part by Cerimon and Marina” (111). Focusing on Cerimon, it
is easy to see Finkelstein’s point.

Cerimon declares that he has “studied physic”

(III.ii.32) and relates the story of “an Egyptian / That had nine hours laid dead, who was /
By good appliance recovered” (III.ii.83-84),

in each case

acknowledging the

effectiveness of medicine, a creation of man. But Shakespeare also gives his audience a
reason to consider that the hand of providence motivates Cerimoms talent: Cerimon’s
“Virtue and cunning” (III.ii.27) will make “man a god” (III.ii.31); “Your honour has /
Through Ephesus poured forth your charity, / And hundreds call themselves your
creatures, who / By you have been restored” (III.ii.42-45), projecting a messiah image
onto Cerimon through the following of all his “creatures”; and to Pericles, Cerimon is the
man “whom the gods have shown their power” (V.iii.61). However, Cerimon’s character
is paradoxical since he represents a moral excellence, “virtue,” at the same time that he
stands for the contradictory skillful deceit, or “cunning.” Associating virtue with grace
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implies a connection with Catholicism and, conversely, if a connection is made between
cunning and self-interest, we see a link with Protestantism.

There are many overt

references to divine providence in the play, for example: “O you gods! / Why do you
make us love your goodly gifts / And snatch them straight away” (III.i.22-24); “We
cannot but obey / The powers above us” (III.iii.9-10); and when Gower says “In Pericles,
his queen and daughter seen, / Although assailed with Fortune fierce and keen, / Virtue
preserved from fell destruction’s blast, / Led on by heaven and crowned with joy at last”
(Epilogue 3-6). These obvious references to the gods and heaven seem to defy the trend
of early seventeenth century culture in which there was a movement away from the
communal concept of providence and more toward individualism.

Zurcher notes that

there was a “particularly acute sense of a loss of faith in providence in the late sixteenth
century and the turn to politic ideology” (908). Gower’s Epilogue may hold the key to
Shakespeare’s position wherein virtue is “preserved from fell destruction’s blast”
(Epilogue 5), where Catholicism is shielded from the self-interest of the Protestant
movement.
Atonement for sin is a belief central to the Catholic religion and Marina will be
the agent of Pericles’ redemption. Imbuing Marina with a sense o f grace and power over
a male informs our third paradox, which asserts that patriarchal power can be dependent
upon the authority of women. Three of the prime beliefs of the Catholic religion, in its
simplest terms, are the creation of man, man’s fall from God’s grace, and man’s attempt
to atone for his sin. Man’s fall from grace is memorialized in the Genesis myth, which
says “that in the Garden of Eden, Adam and Eve had fallen from their paradise because
of their disobedience to God” (MacCulloch 104). Man may make amends through the
practice of penance that may lead God to forgive the sinner. Atonement also plays an

Gilson 29

important part in the recovery of Pericles, but what was his sin? Is he guilty of thoughts
of incest or by association with Antiochus? Is he being punished by the gods for blaming
them for Thaisa’s death? Or, is he accountable for not being able to provide Thaisa a
proper burial? Any of these reasons may impel his need to make recompense. Pericles
vows, “Unscissored shall this hair of mine remain” (III.iii.30) until Marina marries, an
extended sacrifice given that Marina is an infant when he makes this promise; Gower
tells us, “He swears / Never to wash his face nor cut his hairs” (IV.iv.27-28) after Cleon
and Dionyza show Pericles the tomb where Marina is purportedly buried, a vow he
keeps: “Sir, our vessel is of Tyre, in it the king, / A man who for this three months hath
not spoken / To anyone, nor taken sustenance / But to prorogue his g rief’ (V.i. 19-22).
Thorne indicates that this suffering makes Pericles a scapegoat meant to cleanse “society
of its evil" (43), an evil which we presume to be the incest of Antiochus and his unnamed
daughter. Up to this point, Pericles has not only lost his wife and daughter; he has also
failed to provide an heir to his throne and secure the stability and longevity o f Tyre.
Pericles wants to prolong his grief and feel the pain of those he has lost as a form of
penance, “O Helicanus, strike me, honoured sir, / Give me a gash, put me to present pain”
(V.i. 180-81), a punishment so severe it impedes his ability to function as a king and as a
human. The play offers no motivating force to indicate that he would ever recover from
his despair if not for his reunions with Thaisa and Marina later in the play.
If Pericles is the symbol of suffering in Pericles, Marina and Thaisa are figures of
purity and redemption, although each undergoes her own form of penance. Thaisa will
“never more have joy” (III.iv.10) living out the rest of her life in “Diana’s temple”
(Ill.iv. 12) as she falls into a despondency over the loss of her husband and daughter, just
as Pericles did over the loss of his wife and daughter. And from the time Marina was
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born into a storm, she lived without a biological mother and father, was betrayed by
surrogates, captured by pirates, and fought becoming a prostitute.

To Marina, “This

world to me is as a lasting storm” (IV.i. 18). Marina started life in a tempest and her
experiences seem to reflect that inauspicious beginning. Indeed, Pericles describes her
birth by comparing her “chiding...nativity” (III.i.32) to a clash between “fire, air, water,
earth and heaven” (III.i.33), metaphorically linking a creation o f nature and God. The
Bawd touches the same note, “When nature framed this piece, she meant thee a good
turn” (IV.ii.130-31), referring to nature in the feminine, and Gower says, “She sings like
one immortal and she dances / As goddess-like” (V.0.3-4) and “Deep clerks she dumbs
and with her nee’le composes / Nature’s own shape of bud, bird, branch or berry / That
even her art sisters the natural roses” (V.0.5-7). This connection between Marina and the
gods and Marina and nature impart upon her a sense o f grace and fertility, but her
fruitfulness, paradoxically, will be more than offset by her associations with chastity, and
the grace which empowers her to redeem Pericles ultimately will be neutralized.
Marina’s grace demonstrates her power when her mere presence releases Pericles
from his perpetual self-condemnation.

Plutarch’s Marina-like character, Aspasia, also

had “a marvelous gifte and power” (30) and was a person on whom Pericles relied:
“Pericles resorted unto her, because she was a wise woman” (31). Shakespeare provides
numerous examples of Marina’s grace and authority. Marina says, “The gods defend
me” (IV.ii.81) and “something glows upon my cheek / And whispers in mine ear, ‘Go not
till he speak'” (V.i.86-87), leaving the audience with the sense that she is an agent o f god.
The two gentlemen leaving the brothel comment on the effectiveness of Marina’s divinity
preaching (IV.iv.1-9), and Lysimachus attests to Marina’s transformative powers
(IV.v. 106-11). Lysimachus also describes Marina’s ability as a “sacred physic” (V.i.67),
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drawing a distinction between her heavenly art and Cerimon’s “studied physic” (III.ii.32),
an authority achieved through human agency.

Finkelstein also notes this distinction:

“Although with Cerimon, as later with Prospero, Shakespeare seems at times to exalt the
effectiveness of individual agency before fate, his use of Marina strongly presents an
opposing view” (118). Further to this point, Zurcher states, “Marina bestows grace for its
own sake on those long beyond taking account of it” (920) and nowhere is this more
evident than in the redemptive effect Marina has on Pericles. And Moore: “She is an
agent of redemption, bringing Pericles the promise of posterity and effecting an almost
magical transformation” (42). The scene where Pericles realizes that his daughter is still
alive (V.i.74-202) represents a rebirth wherein Pericles changes from a lifeless soul to a
reborn father. But Pericles’ gain will be Marina’s loss as we witness the emergence of
Pericles and the regression of Marina. Without Marina, Pericles would have remained
dormant as a human and as a father. Conversely, without Pericles and without a family,
Marina was self-sufficient and useful to others. But Marina is not the only female figure
in the play to author his new beginning.
Pericles is shaken when Shakespeare introduces Diana o f Ephesus through the
deus ex machina (V.i.226sd), and her appearance raises the conflicting issues o f fertility
and chastity. The Diana of Pericles refers to “the fertility goddess Diana o f Ephesus”
(Hart 347).

Hart links the name Diana to Artemis o f Ephesus, a “chaste woodland

goddess,” and to Cybele of Anatolia, a “Phrygian goddess...linked to moon worship,
agrarianism, and fertility" (348) and embodies the fertility-chastity paradox. Diana is an
ever present image in Pericles and one invoked by male and female characters including,
for example, Pericles (III.i. 10, V.iii.69), Gower (IV.0.29), Thaisa (Ill.ii. 104), and Marina
(IV.ii. 140). Hart observes that Diana “gradually gains in importance” (361) in the play
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and, without her dream state visit to Pericles directing him to Ephesus (V.i.227-36), his
recovery would be incomplete. Hart says that Diana of Ephesus “was one of a group of
powerful ‘Mothers’ who had long been venerated in the eastern Mediterranean” (347-48),
describing Ephesus as a place “often associated with the regenerative spirit of Pauline
scripture...linked to images of religious division” (347).

Ephesus, then, becomes a

metaphor in Pericles for the debate between free will and providence as well as a symbol
of restoration and fertility. Having recovered Marina and been reunited with Thaisa, the
restoration of Pericles is complete. Pericles thanks Dian for her vision and vows “Nightoblations” (V.iii.71) underscoring the significance of female empowerment, for without
Diana, Pericles is never fully restored. Thaisa will rule as “queen” (V.iii.80) at the side
of Pericles and perhaps even be his partner in love. Last, her voice is heard throughout
the play. She is never silenced.
Conversely, if Thaisa is a symbol of the fertile mother and Diana is a powerful
instrument of Pericles’ recovery, Marina is the symbol of chastity who loses her voice by
play’s end. Diana “gradually gains in importance” (Hart 361) in the play while Marina, a
chaste figure, loses her independence and authority after she has redeemed Pericles. She
is then directed into an unwanted marriage to the unsavory Lysimachus and is not heard
from after she has been commoditized (V.iii.71-73) by Pericles. Paradoxically, Marina’s
now helpless female persona overshadows the strong, male-like role she has enacted
throughout the play, overturning “traditional beliefs about male strength and girlish
suffering” (Gossett 382nl27-8). The journey of Pericles begins and ends with him as
Prince of Tyre, but in the intervening period he has been educated through the process of
dismantling and reconstituting the component parts of his manhood.

According to

Annette Flower, those component parts include “true subject” and “‘mere man’” (32),
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prince and son (33), sufferer-widower (34-35), Prince of Tyre (35), and father and
husband (36). Pericles has experienced the suffering normally associated with a woman,
but affirming his virility in the process. Marina’s journey is similar and Pericles implores
Marina to “Tell thy story. / If thine considered prove the thousand part / O f my
endurance, thou art a man, and I / Have suffered like a girl” (V.i. 125-28), inverting the
male-female relationship.

She is born at sea in a fierce storm and “hast as chiding a

nativity / As fire, air, water, earth and heaven can make” (III.i.32-33), she survives
Dionyza’s murder attempt and being kidnapped by pirates, and she manages to maintain
her virginity in a brothel, simultaneously demonstrating an intestinal fortitude normally
associated with a man while suffering in her female role. Her dominant male persona
that appears early in Pericles gives way to the dominated, muted female by play’s end.
There is a strong bias toward grace, instead of man’s agency, in seeking God’s
salvation in Pericles.

Christopher Baker observed that each o f the “final romances

(Pericles, Cymbeline, The Winter’s Tale, and The Tempest) possess overtones of divine
grace or heavenly intervention, which suggest more emphatically a beneficial
providence” (xii). But man’s exercise of free will is woven into the fabric of Pericles
which creates a paradoxical blending with God’s grace. The other two paradoxes, the
value of history to the present and the influence of women on patriarchal power, are
threads that carry through in Cymbeline.

Cymbeline
Cymbeline attempts to define identity and demonstrate how that identity can
change over time. And, whether Shakespeare is interrogating the identity o f a nation or
of a person, he presents the audience with opposing, irreconcilable attributes of each that,
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when taken together, define that nation or person. The paradox of conflicting character
traits situated in one individual will lead to the conclusions that identity is mixed,
inherently unstable, and transient. Cymbeline also shows how identity can be changed
with societal status, words, affiliation, reasoning, dress, circumstance, ideas, atonement,
and by example, anointment, a name change, quitting, theft, and the distance o f time.
This section examines the paradox of identity as Shakespeare applies his focus on the
close links and distinctiveness that Cymbeline's England has with Caesar’s Rome, a
mixture mirrored in the transforming identities of Imogen and Posthumus.
Underlying the confrontations between Britain and Rome, between Cymbeline
and Augustus Caesar, and among the individual characters o f the play is a common effort
to forge identity, but the problem is that one cannot stand alone without being influenced
by those around you.

Cloten makes the isolationist argument, “Britain’s a world by

itself’ (III.i.13), but Cymbeline’s Britain is like the child who seeks to break away from
its Roman parent.

In an essay entitled “A Roman Thought: Renaissance Attitudes to

History Exemplified in Shakespeare and Jonson,” G. K. Hunter writes, “for the English
Renaissance, ‘the Roman past w as...not simply a past but the past’...legendarily linked
to the moment in which Britain itself emerged from history....Rome was as much a
cultural parent as a cultural other” (qtd. Kahn 3-4). Cymbeline tries hard to distance
Britain from its Roman origins, even arguing that Rome’s influence was an interlude
rather than a start, but it is hard to ignore the evidence in the play which both affirms and
negates each position.
The “struggles between the Britons and the Romans,” as noted in Holinshed’s
Chronicle of “Kymberline or Cimberline” (228), can be seen as the bridge which
connected Shakespeare’s Cymbeline to its historic predecessor.

Leah Marcus “takes
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Shakespeare's Cymbeline (1609) as a case study for the conflict between James and
Elizabeth,” but she also “reads Cymbeline as having a ‘harmonious internationalism’”
where “The British and Roman ensigns wave ‘Friendly together’” (qtd. Crawford
376n23). Indeed, “Set in Roman Briton,” the play seems to question James I’s proposed
union of England and Scotland (Escobedo 62). These struggles, conflicts, and issues of
national identity are captured in Holinshed’s Cymbeline:
Kymbeline being brought vp in Rome, & knighted in the court of
Augustus, euer shewed himselfe a friend to the Romans, & chieflie was
loth to breake with them, because the youth o f the Britaine nation should
not be depriued of the benefit to be trained and brought vp among the
Romans, whereby they might learne both to behaue themselues like ciuill
men, and to atteine to the knowledge of feats of warre.

(229)

Holinshed’s Cymbeline sought “to improve his isolated kingdom through educational
exchanges that would foster in young Britons a balance o f courtly manners and martial
prowess” (Collington 311). The “youth of the Britaine nation” who can learn civility and
the art of war imply that they do not currently possess those attributes and demonstrates
Kymbeline’s “desire for an ancient and dignified past” (Escobedo 67), a concept explored
in Pericles, especially in the characters o f Gower and Helicanus and in the references to
the father of Pericles (II.i.116-30 and II.iii.36-46), and noted in Cymbeline’s declaration
of Britain's independence to Caius Lucius (III.i.54-62). Shakespeare’s king Cymbeline,
conversely, resists the ties to Rome, while also acknowledging them, and will fight all
enemies, foreign and domestic, that attempt to taint the identity o f his nation.
From Cymbeline’s perspective, the purity o f Britain is threatened by the mixture
of Imogen’s royal blood with the common blood of her new husband Posthumus.
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Cymbeline’s concern is well placed when considering the consequences suffered by
Antiochus and his unnamed daughter in Pericles. As Bonnie Lander notes: “In question
in Cymbeline is the purity of the nation....Control of female sexuality determines purity
of descent” (172).

Sicilius Leonatus, father o f Posthumus, fought with honor and

distinction against the Romans alongside Cassibelan (I.i.28-41), Cymbeline’s uncle, but
in the end they are not related and therefore not worthy o f noble positions.

Philip

Collington argues, “Posthumus represents the lost scion of a military dynasty who, solely
on his own merit, earns admittance to the innermost circle of Roman Britain’s political
elite” (301). Indeed, Cymbeline refers to Posthumus as a “base thing” (I.i.56) and says to
him, “Thou'rt poison to my blood” (I.ii.59), indicating the low esteem in which
Cymbeline holds Posthumus and the threat that the king sees to his royal roots. The
notion of contamination is reinforced when Cymbeline says to Imogen, “Thou took’st a
beggar, wouldst have made my seat a throne / A seat for baseness” (I.ii.72-73).

But

Cymbeline's words betray his past relationship with Posthumus whom he protected and
bred from infancy when Posthumus lost his mother and father (I.i.36-41). Posthumus
who, “liv'd in court / (Which rare it is to do) most prais’d, most lov’d; / A sample to the
youngest” (I.i.46-48), this mirror of excellence, instantly became “base” and “poison” to
Cymbeline, even though Cymbeline was responsible for his noble upbringing (I.i.42).
Codington is right when he says that “Posthumus will be dogged throughout his life by
uncertainty about his parentage” (301).

The marriage immediately changed who

Posthumus was to Cymbeline, no longer a “glass” (Li.49) of perfection, even though at
the moment of marriage he was still the same person he had always been.

But

Cymbeline’s “mirror of excellence” lost his luster only from the point of view of the
king.

Later in the play, Iachimo will make the counter argument (I.v.12-15) that the
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marriage enriched the reputation of Posthumus rather than tarnished his name. He states
that the great reputation that Posthumus enjoys is merely a function of his relationship to
Imogen: “This matter of marrying the king’s daughter, where-in he must be weighed
rather by her value than his own, words him (I doubt not) a great deal from the matter”
(I.v.12-15). Association and words, not deeds, are what define Posthumus to Iachimo.
However, one must consider the source of the character definition.
Iachimo will expose his own conniving, untrustworthy side when he makes his
bet with Posthumus and during his encounter with Imogen which may cause an observer
to question the veracity of Iachimo’s assessment.

From Iachimo’s perspective,

Posthumus is a man defined by his wife and the audience cannot help but side, to some
degree, with Iachimo as the stable character of Posthumus appears to unravel as the play
progresses. Shakespeare hints at the change to come in Posthumus, through the eye of
Imogen, as Posthumus transitions from man to thin air leaving the shores of Britain:
I would have broke mine eye-strings, crack’d them, but
To look upon him, till the diminution
O f space had pointed him sharp as my needle:
Nay, followed him, till he had melted from
The smallness of a gnat, to air: and then
Have turn’d mine eye, and wept.

(I.iv. 17-22)

The incomparable Posthumus will quickly transform into nothing as he leaves his life and
nation behind. While Posthumus, still in a British state o f mind, staunchly defends the
honor of Imogen in his encounter with Iachimo (I.v.74-143), later he will call for her
execution (III.ii.ll), a symbolic attack on England, while located in Rome. Indeed, the
tenor of the discussion between Iachimo and Posthumus is not only a wager against
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Imogen’s honor, but can be characterized as two diplomats discussing national strategies
since they have “articles betwixt us” (I.v. 153-54), speak as enemies (I.v.157) o f “assault”
(I.v.159), and will settle matters by “sword” (I.v. 161). Imogen is, in effect, a territory to
be fought over and Posthumus has converted from husband to military attaché. Roman
Iachimo launches his attack on Imogen, hence Britain, by convincing Imogen that
Posthumus “Has forgot Britain” (I.vii. 113) and by trying to deceive and violate her
(I.vii. 132-39).

Iachimo has distorted Imogen’s perception o f Posthumus through his

demeanor and words and he begins to change the way Imogen sees Posthumus. At this
moment, Posthumus is an exiled British citizen living in Rome defending Britain, but he
will become the inverse of that, if only for the briefest of time, as the play proceeds, a
proclaimed Roman fighting against his home country. There is a transition period in
which we are not sure whether Posthumus is, in effect, still British or a newly molded
Roman. The Queen foreshadows this liminal status when she says, “Return he cannot,
nor / Continue where he is” (I.vi.53-54). Iachimo will continue his battle with Posthumus
by strategically positioning himself to scout Imogen’s bedchamber and her body as if he
were scouting a battlefield (II.ii.23-51). In the meantime, as the play reveals more of
Cloten’s personality, Shakespeare further queries the idea of identity by affiliation.
Iachimo thought that the identity o f Posthumus was defined by his relationship to
Imogen. Conversely, Cloten’s character and reputation seem to bear little relationship to
his mother the Queen. The Second Lord disparages Cloten with statements like: “To
have smelt like a fool” (II.i.16), “He’s a strange fellow himself, and / knows it not”
(II.i.35-36), and “You are a fool granted” (II.i.46), subsequently comparing Cloten to the
Queen with, “That such a crafty devil as his mother / Should yield the world this ass”
(II.i.51-52). The implication of the marriage between Imogen and Posthumus may be
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that outsiders are unwelcome at court, but the fallacy is that Britain likely would have
been worse off had Imogen married the blundering and unsophisticated Cloten. As Kahn
notes, “Neither is fit to ‘be jointed to the old stock’ of Britain’s family tree, that ‘stately
cedar’ identified with Cymbeline” (166).

The king chooses to ignore the potential

contamination to his throne had the incestuous marriage between Imogen and Cloten
occurred.

The Second Lord of Cymbeline’s court may have belittled Cloten, but

Shakespeare quickly counters this perception by unexpectedly imparting on him an
implied level of diplomatic authority, albeit as yet unsubstantiated in the play, when
Cymbeline invites him to meet with Roman Ambassador Caius Lucius: “we will have
need / T’employ you towards this Roman” (II.iii.61-62). Being part of Caius Lucius’
receiving party is the closest Cloten will come to being like his mother, and it is actually
a job he does quite well.

One may argue that he is too direct, but he plainly and

accurately tells Lucius that there is no modem day Julius Caesar to challenge his nation
(III.i.12-14), that Britain “is stronger than it was at that time” (III.i.34), and that there is
no real reason to continue Rome’s monetary tribute (III.i.41-46). In these exchanges, his
keen power of observation compares favorably to the Queen’s craftiness and makes us
forget, if only for the moment, his less refined side. But Shakespeare again redirects our
opinion when Imogen voices the ultimate insult to Cloten by telling him that his worth is
less than that of an inanimate object such as Posthumus’ clothes: “His mean’st garment, /
That ever hath but clipped his body, is dearer / In my respect, than all the hairs above
thee” (Il.iii. 132-34).

At least when the Queen was talking about the identity of

Posthumus she described him in human terms, but Imogen says that Cloten is not even
equivalent to the shadow of a man. Cloten is so offended that he can only manage a
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series of scattered, stuttered responses (11.136-55) which repeat the slight he finds so
incomprehensible.
One might, in this instance, draw a parallel to James I, who was widely perceived
to be a crude outsider, just like Cloten. At work culturally between the lines of the play is
an interrogation of England’s identity after the death o f Queen Elizabeth, an unmarried
female monarch who kept England independent, and the beginning of the rule o f James I,
who was a Scottish, married, male monarch.

Could there have been two more

dramatically different, successive monarchs with more dissimilar characters and goals for
Britain? James and Elizabeth seemed to enjoy a warm relationship before the queen’s
death, for example: “I render you many thanks for your bond of firm and constant amity”
(Elizabeth 383), but James seemed later to resent the memory of Elizabeth because,
“After James accedes to the throne, viragos and warrior women are no longer
celebrated....James defined his reign, in many ways, in opposition to Elizabeth’s”
(Crawford 360). James I also sought to change the face of England by joining England
and Scotland into a new Great Britain, thereby ensuring and consolidating his power
base: “The most important matter on the agenda was James’ plans for Union between the
kingdoms” (de Lisle 280). The problem posed by the proposed union is the fertile ground
on which Cymbeline interrogates the question of national identity, and the paradox of
identity alternately focuses on Imogen and Posthumus.
Shakespeare returns his audience to the duel between Iachimo and Posthumus,
which is reflective of the battle between Rome and Britain as played out in the meetings
and dialogue between Cymbeline and Lucius, by first reminding us that the distance of
time may change perception.

Specifically, Philario asks Posthumus, “What means do

you make to him” (II.iv.3), meaning that he wants to know how Posthumus will persuade
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the king that he is not “base” or “poison.” Posthumus responds: “Not any: but abide the
change of time, / Quake in the present winter’s state, and wish / That warmer days would
come” (II.iv.4-6). Posthumus has no plan, no device to effect that change, merely the
hope that Cymbeline will change his mind as time passes. His hope appears to be based
on the change in disposition Britain has taken toward the renewed threat of a Roman
invasion. Long ago, Rome invaded Britain and won an annual tribute that Britain now
refuses to pay. Posthumus does not believe that Cymbeline will agree to reinstate the
tribute because Cymbeline’s Britain is stronger than the one defeated by Rome in another
time: “Our countrymen / Are men more order’d than when Julius Caesar / Smil'd at their
lack of skill" (II.iv.20-22). Posthumus would appear to hope for such a sea change in the
attitude Cymbeline has toward him, but his reasoning is relegated to the background
when Iachimo appears to have won Imogen’s virtue.
When Iachimo returns to Philario’s house, claiming to have seduced Imogen, he
describes Imogen’s room (II.iv.80-91), produces her bracelet (II.iv.95sd), and accurately
describes the location of Imogen’s mole “under her breast” (Il.iv. 134), thereby igniting
murderous rage (Il.iv.47-49) in Posthumus and transforming him from a loving husband
(I.i.26-27) into a misogynist (Il.iv. 153-86). Imogen is no longer his wife, but someone
who has “bought the name of whore” (Il.iv. 128), and his sudden hatred for Imogen alters
his perception of all women: “The vows o f women / O f no more bondage be to where
they are made / Than they are to their virtues, which is nothing” (Il.iv. 110-14). He even
includes his mother in the category of women as unvirtuous liars, “And that most
venerable man, which I / Did call my father, was I know not where / When I was
stamp’d” (Il.iv. 155-57), while simultaneously affirming the merit of being a man. When
he realizes that man cannot exist without woman, “Is there no way for men to be, but
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women / Must be half-workers” (II.iv. 153-54), he reaffirms his masculinity by stating
that the unpleasant composition of women is exclusive to them: “Could I find out / The
woman’s part in me - for there’s no motion / That tends to vice in man, but I affirm / It is
the women’s part” (II.iv.171-73). Posthumus’ reasoning imbeds an inherent male-female
paradox.

If men are virtuous and women are not, and men are made up, in part, of

women, how can men not have a natural tendency toward being unvirtuous?
As the complex action of Cymbeline jumps from one subplot to the next, we are
once again returned to the king’s meeting with Caius Lucius wherein Cymbeline asserts
an identity for Britain that has evolved from the time when Julius Caesar “was in this
Britain / And conquer’d it” (III.i.4-5). We have previously seen how precise Cloten was
in defending Britain’s sovereignty and now Cymbeline takes it a step further by rattling
the saber of war: Caesar “Did put the yoke upon’s; which to shake off / Becomes a
warlike people, whom we reckon / Ourselves to be” (III.i.52-54). Cymbeline’s threat,
though, is not merely a prelude to war encouraged by an unpaid tribute; rather Cymbeline
is reclaiming the origins of his country stolen and corrupted by Caesar: “Our ancestor
was that Mulmutius which / Ordain’d our laws, whose use the sword of Caesar / Hath too
much mangled.. .Mulmutius made our laws, / Who was the first of Britain which did put /
His brows within a golden crown, and call’d / Himself a king” (III.i.55-62). Escobedo
summarizes the opposing Roman and British positions this way:
Caesar may have conquered the island several generations earlier, but
Dunwallo (“Mulmutius”) established civilized British culture well before
that, at least according to Geoffrey of Monmouth. Anticipating Edmund
Bolton’s admonition, this scene of Cymbeline defines the nation’s present
through its past.

( 68)
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This is the very same point made in the Pericles section.

Cymbeline’s Britain is an

agglomeration of the identity bestowed upon it by Mulmutius and by Caesar, even though
one side denies the other. This denial reflects back to the question Posthumus posed
regarding who “stamp’d'” (Il.iv. 157) him and it forces the audience to question the origins
of identity.
Up to this point in the play, Imogen has not changed much from the love-struck
and tormented virgin bride (III.ii.26-83), a person who has yet to be corrupted by the
influences of society outside the walls of her court. But all that changes with a change of
clothes.

Imogen will travel to Milford-Haven in disguise: “provide me presently / A

riding-suit; no costlier than would fit / A franklin’s housewife” (III.ii.76-78).

By

changing her clothes she will, presumably, be able to travel without the notice that her
more courtly garments would attract. Her disguise facilitates her travel, but it does more
than that. The clothes of a “franklin’s housewife” begin to change her identity, for she is
no longer a princess, but a common spouse o f a landowner. This is the beginning o f an
educational experience, reminiscent of Pericles’ journey, that will change her perspective
of the world even though she will always be a princess. Her impending transition from
female to male is foreshadowed by her curious statement to Pisano: “I see before me,
man” (III.ii.79). Initially, one might think that she is referring to Pisano who stands in
front of her, but that serves no purpose. Perhaps she is referring to the expectation that
Posthumus will stand before her in Milford-Haven? Or, possibly, is the path before her
open only to men? Does this imply that she may have to become a “man” in order to
travel down that path? Her reference to “a fog...That I cannot look through” (III.ii.8081) can mean that, as a woman, she has no real insight into what it means to be a man. It
is impossible to tell her precise meaning, but she is moving away from the person she is.
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Imogen equates herself to “a garment out of fashion” (III.iv.52) when she learns
of Posthumus’ accusations, and we must remember how Imogen told Cloten that he was
worth less than a garment. She has now devolved from princess, to common housewife,
to a shadow of her former selves. Imogen will redefine all men in the same negative vein
that Posthumus redefined all women as unvirtuous liars: “Men’s vows are women’s
traitors! All good seeming, / By thy revolt, O husband, shall be thought / Put on for
villainy; not born where’t grows, / But worn a bait for ladies” (III.iv.55-58). Posthumus
is no longer her husband, but someone who “Wilt lay the leaven on all proper men”
(III.iv.63), souring Imogen on the entire male species.

Posthumus asserted his

masculinity when he made his declaration against all women, but Imogen does the
opposite and moves instead toward becoming a man. Imogen is a woman at a crossroads
that typically only men can travel, and she asks, “What shall I do the while? Where bide?
How live? / Or in my life what comfort, when I am / Dead to my husband” (Ill.iv.ISO32). Her identity as a princess is in question and begins to crossover from her female
world to the male world suggested by Pisano: “You must forget to be a woman”
(Ill.iv. 156). Imogen cannot return to her court in Britain, yet she doesn’t belong in the
plains to Milford-Haven. She is in the same liminal place that Posthumus finds himself.
Her transformation unfolds as she appears “in b o y’s clothes” (III.vi.sd) and names herself
“Fidele” (III.vii.33).

She is a female inhabiting male identity and even says that she

would willingly “change my sex to be companion” (III.vii.60) with Belarius, Guiderius,
and Arviragus, a concept which completely controverts her assessment that all men are
villains.
The passage of time allows Imogen to discover her new friends, and we witness
the effect that the passage of time has on identity. Pisano hopes “But to win time / To
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lose so bad employment” (III.iv.111-12), meaning that if he waits long enough he may
not have to execute Imogen as he was commanded to by Posthumus; he hopes something
will intervene. The Queen is more explicit: “Since the exile of Posthumus, most retir'd /
Hath her life been: the cure whereof, my lord, / ‘Tis time must do” (III.v.36-38). Much
has already been noted about the passage of time and how the distance of time can alter
one’s perception.

Belarius counsels Guiderius and Arviragus on the related topic of

perceptions being changed by physical distance: “Consider, / When you above perceive
me like a crow, / That it is place which lessens and sets off, / And you may then revolve
what tales I have told you / O f Courts, of princes; o f tricks of war” (III.iii.11-15).
Belarius will “tread these flats” (III.iii.ll) while his adoptive sons observe him from
above as a soaring crow might. From these heights, they will see Belarius as they’ve not
seen him before, and he counsels them to consider the lessons he has taught them from a
new perspective. This indicates that people see things another way when they look at
them from a different viewpoint enabling the paradox o f identity.
Imogen learns the lesson that Belarius taught his sons: “Gods, what lies I have
heard! / Our courtiers say all’s savage but at court; / Experience, O, thou disprov’st
report” (IV.ii.33-34).

She has discovered that the world beyond her myopic court

existence is not as bad as has been represented, that Belarius, Guiderius, and Arviragus
are not savages, but “kind creatures” (IV.ii.32). Her perception of the world changed
when she changed her vantage point.
Guiderius and Arviragus learn the same thing.

Guiderius complains that their

cave is a “cell of ignorance” (III.iii.33) which feels like a “prison” (III.iii.34) and
Arviragus complains that they have not had the same advantage of experience provided
to their father (III.iii.35-36), that they “have seen nothing” (III.iii.39). Belarius attributes
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their restlessness to an inherent feel for something else: ‘T th’ cave wherein they bow,
their thoughts do hit / The roofs of palaces, and Nature prompts therm (lll.iii.83-84).
Belarius understands that it is hard to “hide the sparks of Nature” (III.iii.79) because he
knows that they are the biological sons of Cymbeline and that he “stole these babes”
(lll.iii. 101) when they were young children.
Belarius is known as “Morgan” (lll.iii. 106) in the hills of Wales where he settled
after being banished by Cymbeline and his double identity signals a mixed personality.
Morgan says, “Cymbeline lov'd me, / And when a soldier was the theme, my name / Was
not far o f f (lll.iii.58-60), but when “two villains...swore to Cymbeline / I was
confederate with the Romans” (lll.iii.66-68), he was exiled. Morgan was an honorable
soldier, but when he felt betrayed by Cymbeline he became a kidnapper.

Imogen is

similarly undone by Iachimo’s lies to Posthumus and, like Morgan, will be compelled to
adopt another persona. Lies, in effect, began the process o f change to their identities. As
time passes, Morgan’s identity will evolve from kidnapper to strong father figure as he
notes the princely demeanor of his adopted sons (lll.iii.80, IV.ii. 169-72). The courtly
backdrop and polish which Posthumus earned under the tutelage o f Cymbeline and
Imogen stands in contrast to the country upbringing imparted by Belarius to the
biological sons of Cymbeline.

Robert Adams describes the contrast as “between the

florid and often dishonest wit of the court and the flat, even foolish, but genuine speech
of the country” (67) and argues that “‘Court' stands for formality and authority but also
for softness, ‘country’ for natural affection but also for austere masculine virtue” (81).
Leanda de Lisle makes a related comparison between Scotland and England:
In Scotland they still lived in ancient manses furnished only by a few basic
necessities.

In England, by contrast, they had new, light, airy houses
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embellished with elaborate plaster ceilings and carved chimneypieces and
furnished with wall hangings, carpets and furniture, crystal and silks.
(148)
Cymbeline might have considered Polydore and Cadwal “base” and “poison” if he had
encountered them as country peasants, but he may have embraced Guiderius and
Arviragus if he knew their real identities. This is exactly what happens to Posthumus.
He went from being the “mirror of excellence” to banished commoner based on the
perception of Cymbeline, yet he was the same person. This reflects badly on Cymbeline
because he banishes a man, Posthumus, who is not a threat, while not realizing that his
crown has been usurped by Belarius.

Belarius kidnapped Guiderius, the “heir of

Cymbeline and Britain” (III.iii.88). A Roman invasion is certainly a serious threat, but
perhaps a greater threat came from within Cymbeline’s court. By blocking the ascension
of Cymbeline’s heir, Britain’s identity has been hijacked and the court was too ignorant
to respond.
The identities of Guiderius-Polydore and Arviragus-Cadwal are themselves a
paradox.

Belarius says that “cowards father cowards, and base things sire base”

(IV.ii.26) meaning that offspring are reflective of their parentage. Thus far we have only
witnessed the actions of Polydore and Cadwal and they are all attributable to Morgan.
Belarius is a kidnapper, but Morgan is an adoptive father. We cannot ignore that the
Belarius-Morgan combination has raised two kind and capable young men who, by
Cymbeline’s standard, would likely find them crude warrior peasants. Conversely, while
the king is their biological father and Belarius touts their inherent nobility (IV.ii. 176-81),
Cymbeline has had no impact on the men that they have become. So what is the right
interpretation of Guiderius-Polydore and Arviragus-Cadwal? Are they crude countrymen
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or are they displaced members of the court? Are they warriors or potential nobles? Are
they intelligent, observant and independent, or are they simple, unaware, and dominated?
The answer is that their identities are comprised of all these characteristics and the only
variance from this is the degree to which they embody each of those attributes. They are,
paradoxically, products of their parentage and environment and express the attitudes of
each.
Cloten calls Guiderius “a robber, / A law-breaker, a villain” (IV.ii.74-75) to which
Guiderius responds, “To who” (IV.ii.76) which reinforces the notion that identity can be
in the eye of the beholder. Cloten based his opinion on the dress of Guiderius and on the
location of their encounter.

Cloten does not know that this base villain has higher

standing in the court than he does, a place Guiderius has never visited. Cloten will not
survive outside that comfort zone.

Before he meets Guiderius, Cloten had defined

himself against the identity of Posthumus: “the lines of my body are as well drawn as his;
no less young, more strong, not beneath him in fortunes, beyond him in the advantage of
time, above him in birth, alike conversant in general services, and more remarkable in
single oppositions” (IV.i.9-13). None of these attributes speak to the true character o f a
man. Cloten appears ever to be searching for his identity and he wonders why Guiderius
doesn’t recognize him based solely on his dress: “Know’st me not by my clothes”
(IV.ii.81).

O f course, Cloten’s apparel does not identify him to Guiderius because

Guiderius does not know what the clothes of a noble might look like. Even if he did, the
message seems clear, that the clothes do not make the man. It is ironic that Cloten would
want to be recognized by his dress because he became incensed when Imogen suggested
that he was worth less than Posthumus’ “meanest garment.” Apparently, Cloten has been
searching for his identity for some time because Belarius says, “time hath nothing blurr’d
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those lines of favour / Which he then wore” (IV.ii 104-05). This implies that the passage
of time does not always change people. Cloten’s elusive identity comes to a head when
Imogen mistakes his corpse for that of Posthumus (IV.ii.295-311), but this is more than a
commentary on the character of Cloten, it reflects on Posthumus, as well. Stephen Orgel
observed, “The headless corpse scene is an astonishing moment, not least because it
requires us to reconsider just how different the loathsome, murderous rapist really is from
the adored, idealized husband: they turn out, at this moment, to be all but identical”
(Cymbeline 279).

Even worse, Imogen denies Cloten even in death, not only by

mistaking his corpse for Posthumus, but by fabricating for him the entirely fictional
identity of “Richard du Champ” (IV.ii.377). The lack of identity beyond the walls of his
home has cost Cloten his life because he could not function beyond their protection.
Posthumus and Imogen face the same challenge.
Once he was banished early in Act I, Posthumus transforms from favored son and
husband, to exiled British citizen, and last to murderous misogynist by the end o f Act II.
A span of three full acts passes before he appears again at the beginning o f Act V. One
might call this absence a dramatic necessity given the level o f action in the intervening
scenes, but we might also see it as proof that the distance o f time changes people,
especially since the play offers no reason for the forgiveness and repentance Posthumus
will now display. Posthumus wonders, “how many / Must murder wives much better
than themselves / For wrying but a little” (V.i.3-5) seemingly acknowledging the error of
his response to Imogen’s alleged infidelity. But should she pay for her deed with her
life? Is the punishment commensurate? Posthumus’ logic is flawed because Imogen was
either unfaithful or she was not, but she cannot wry “but a little.” Nonetheless, he
recognizes that love is not perfect and laments his loss: “You snatch some hence for little
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faults; that's love” (V.i.12). As his thoughts turn toward his future, we learn that he has
lived “Among th' Italian gentry, and to fight / Against my lady’s kingdom” (V.i.18-19),
but pledges: “I’ll disrobe me / O f these Italian weeds, and suit myself / As does a Briton
peasant” (V.i.22-24).

And, just when we believe that he has resolved his crisis in

identity, he sinks to the lowest possible level and seeks death, the ultimate loss o f self:
“so I’ll fight / Against the part I come with: so I’ll die / For thee” (V.i.24-26). But even
though Posthumus seeks death, there is reason to believe that his future may prove
different because he looks to his roots for strength: “Gods, put the strength o’ th’ Leonati
in me” (V.i.31).
The second scene of Act V is set in a “Field between the British and Roman
Camps” where Posthumus follows Roman General Lucius and the Italian Iachimo “like a
poor soldier” (V.ii.sd). The location between opposing camps is symbolic o f Posthumus’
indeterminate heritage because, at this moment, he is neither British nor Roman. He is on
the fringe of both, but part of neither, making him a being without place and a person in
turmoil. In the initial staging of the scene, Posthumus fights on the side o f the Romans,
but once they leave the stage and then return, Posthumus is seen fighting Iachimo whom
he has “vanquisheth and disarmeth” (V.ii.sd).

Posthumus helps rescue Cymbeline

(V.ii.l3sd), engages in battle in the “straight lane” (V.iii.7) with his British compatriots,
but surrender himself as “A Roman” (V.iii.89), all to engage death. The “straight lane”
could have ended life for Posthumus, but as Kahn notes, “Posthumus’ valor in the narrow
lane establishes him, finally, as a fit bridegroom for Imogen and future ruler of Britain”
(168).

Paradoxically, the location that was planned for his death turned out to be a

location that was part of his rebirth, something Posthumus has yet to recognize. He is
jailed for being a Roman enemy and he still seeks death: “For Imogen’s dear life take
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mine” (V.iv.22). The journey of Posthumus through the identity quagmire requires a jolt
to lift him from his nadir, and that shove is provided by the images from his dream (like
Pericles). Sicilius, his father, appears as a ghost and reinforces his origins: “Great nature,
like his ancestry, / moulded the stuff so fair, / That he deserved the praise o’ tlv world, as
great Sicilius’ heir” (V.iv.48-51). We see very early in the play that Posthumus was born
of good stock and that the encounter with his father in the dream is meant to remind him
of his roots and move him to regain his position. Posthumus will act on his father’s wish,
prompted additionally by the prophesy o f the “book” (V.iv.133), and regain the favor of
Imogen, “Hang there like fruit, my soul, / Till the tree die” (V.v.263), once he realizes
that she is not dead. He also comes full circle with Cymbeline as the accepted husband to
Imogen: “W e’ll learn our freeness of a son-in-law: / Pardon’s the word to all” (V.v.42223). Posthumus may appear to be the same person at the end of the play that he was at
the beginning, but his experiences have reshaped his character and revealed to the
audience the complex, conflicting nature of his identity. He is far from the perfect man
first described by the First Gentleman, and he may be back in the good graces of the king,
but the balance of power within Cymbeline’s own family is about to change.
The marriage of Imogen and Posthumus prompted Cymbeline to banish
Posthumus and forced Imogen to run away. Events conspired against them and triggered
a change to their personas that saw them devolve as individuals.

Posthumus hit the

bottom of that abyss when he sought death. Similarly, Imogen urged Pisano twice to end
her misery, “Do thou thy master’s bidding” (III.iv.66) and “The lamb entreats the
butcher” (III.iv.98), but this is not the moment that she completely loses herself. Belarius
observes that Imogen, disguised as Fidele, “appears he hath had / Good ancestors”
(IV.ii.47-48), yet when asked by Lucius, “What art thou” (IV.ii.367), Imogen replies “I
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am nothing” (IV.ii.368).

There is no transformative push to revitalize Imogen in the

same way that the ghosts of Posthumus have moved him. Instead, Imogen goes from
“nothing” to a duteous servant as Lucius sings her praise (V.v.83-92) so that Cymbeline
will spare her life. Belarius was right about her “Good ancestors” because Cymbeline
sees something in her that gives him comfort, “Boy, / Thou hast look’d thyself into my
grace, / And art mine own” (V.v.93-95), and what he sees is a reflection of himself. But
only eleven lines later Imogen will abandon Lucius after seeing Posthumus’ ring on the
hand of Iachimo (V.v. 102-04), telling Cymbeline that “He is a Roman, no more kin to me
/ Than your highness” (V.v. 112-13). Imogen is true to her British roots by siding against
a Roman, but her lack of loyalty to Lucius, or even sympathy for him, reveals an
unsavory side that we would not have seen at the beginning of the play. Yet, on the other
hand, while she disclaims Lucius, she simultaneously says that she is not related to
Cymbeline when, in fact, she is. So, if she is lying about being related to the king, she
must be lying about being “kin” to Lucius.

She is, at once, a Roman and Briton.

Ultimately, her true identity is revealed (V.v.264-65) and she again is heir to her father’s
throne, until Cymbeline learns that Guiderius and Arviragus are his biological sons
(V.v.331-32). Imogen first lost her right to the crown when she married Posthumus and,
now that the true lineage of Guiderius is discovered, she has lost it again as Cymbeline
makes clear: “O Imogen, / Thou hast lost by this a kingdom” (V.v.373-74). She may no
longer be heir to the crown, but she is at least a king’s daughter again (V.v.401-02) and a
wife whose husband has been embraced by her father. Posthumus, once again, owes a
part of his identity to his relationship with Imogen, a theme that reverberates back to the
discussion in Pericles about the dependency that men have on women.
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Cymbeline ends with the reconciliation and reunion common to tragicomedy.
King Cymbeline is reunited with his lost sons Guiderius and Arviragus, he has reconciled
with Belarius, Imogen, and Posthumus, and the evil Queen and her clumsy son have been
eliminated.

The play has chronicled many transformations of identity, personal and

national, and Britain has prevailed over Rome securing its independence. Why, then,
does Cymbeline take the seemingly incongruous action of returning tribute to Caesar and
the Roman empire, “Although the victor, we submit to Caesar, / And to the Roman
empire” (V.v.461-62), the very person and nation from whom and which the British
sought distance? Escobedo argues that, “They return to the Roman model, but on their
own terms” (70), which would actually bring the nations closer together. Going back to
the “Roman model” makes sense if Crawford is right about James’ link to Rome: “James
consciously placed a ‘Roman stamp on his reign’...and James’ critics were leery o f his
Roman identifications” (360). We can even extend Crawford’s conclusion about the play
Bonduca, where “Caratach’s loyalty to men (Roman soldiers) ultimately overrides his
loyalty to Britain, and at the end of the play he capitulates to Rome” (365), to the
conclusion of Cymbeline. This line of reasoning implies a sense of disloyalty and may,
subversively, be taking issue with the rule of King James I. Kahn says that “Cymbeline
is driven to acknowledge Rome’s preeminence, to maintain that cultural tie through a
nominally hierarchal relationship that recapitulates Rome’s dominance when it no longer
actually obtains” (161), meaning Britain had a choice in determining payment of the
tribute. And that, in the end, is where Holinshed’s Cymbeline began, with an option to
pay tribute: “he was at libertie to pay his tribute or not” (228). Either Cymbeline drama,
Holinshed's or Shakespeare’s, had this option at one time or another. Augustus Caesar
initially granted Holinshed’s Cymbeline the option, but the option was lost when Caesar
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died. Shakespeare’s king initially had no option, but fought for that right. One can argue
that Cymbeline used poor judgment in reinstituting the tribute, but maybe it reflects more
positively on him than that. Maybe Cymbeline was showing a national gratitude that, in
and of itself, identifies his Britain as being more civil for having made the gesture.
Britain is independent, but is now more like Rome. The passage o f time granted the
citizens of Britain the opportunity to effect that independence through the resolution of
the paradoxical pairing of irreconcilable, yet coexistent, identities.

The Winter’s Tale

delves deeper into the structure of those identities by examining the difference between
their appearance and their reality.

The Winter’s Tale
Shakespeare’s tragicomedies generally move from a point of crisis and darkness
toward resolution and a lighter tone. The initial crisis in The Winter’s Tale is spurred by
lack of trust. The title of the play associates winter with bleakness, but winter is seasonal
and the natural movement toward happy resolution suggests a future connection with
spring and, therefore, the broader backdrop of the cycle of life. Dylan Thomas said of his
poetic creations that “any sequence of my images must be a sequence of creations,
recreations, destructions, contradictions” (Tritschler 422).

This description is also a

reflection of nature’s process of creation, destruction, and rebirth, “the paradox o f life
creating and consuming itself’ (Tritschler 422).

Winter has a metaphoric association

with death because of its characteristic dormancy just as spring has a similar association
with life and birth. The emergence of one at the expense o f another implies a friction
between opposites. Shakespeare seems to purposely invite collision between, and among,
these opposites in order to accentuate them while simultaneously highlighting their
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differences. Contradiction is an integral part o f this sequence and in The Winter’s Tale
we can track incongruity through competing images of appearance and reality.

The

coexistence of truth and falsehood can be discerned by looking closely at the characters
of Mamillius, Autolycus, Antigonus and Camillo and by seeing how they interact. The
interrogation of truth over the space o f sixteen years will demonstrate that appearances
can deceive and that, ultimately, time reveals the truths that lie behind appearance.
Hermione’s transformation and Polixenes’ assertion that nature supersedes art are also
fertile grounds for this comparison.

Movement through life’s cycle requires

metamorphosis, and there is no better example o f this in the play than when Leontes
repents.
In The Winter’s Tale, the paradox of life creating and consuming itself begins
with Leontes’ destruction of his family and relationships, and ends with the happy
reconstruction of his family in conjunction with the promise that life will continue after
he and Hermione are gone. The play begins in winter with the destructive effects of
Leontes’ jealousy and false accusation, “for ’tis Polixenes / Has made thee swell thus”
(II.i.61-62), and then makes a transition to the spring “celebration of that nuptial”
(IV.iv.50) between Florizel and Perdita. The divide between the dark side o f winter and
the lighter side of spring is so distinct that Shakespeare provides a literal break point
between the tragic and comic components of his tragicomedy in the conversation between
the Old Shepard and the Clown: “thou met’st with things dying, I with things new-born”
(III.iii.112-13).

The Clown witnesses the bear eating Antigonus and Old Shepard

discovers the infant Perdita. Among others, Dennis Biggins notes that, “This transition,
from the melodramatically remote world of Antigonus’ soliloquy via the bear to the
earthily comic reality of the old shepherd’s speech, ‘not only expresses the sense of
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different worlds but has an important technical work to do, that of throwing a bridge
across the two halves of the play’” (4). Indeed, the Shepherd’s line can make it seem as
if Shakespeare merely glued a tragedy onto a comedy in order to produce The Winter's
Tale, a concept on which Colie comments:
In its own peculiar shorthand, The Winter’s Tale is a truncated torso o f a
play. It pays no tribute to those demands for classical modulation between
genres and modes that drove Guarini and his defenders so carefully to
explain how to mix comic and tragic

genres in one decorum.

Shakespeare’s play simply forces us to face what is ‘tragic’ and what is
‘comic’ in life and in plays, forces questions of genre and decorum. The
playwright makes no compromise with generic expectations or even with
conventional verisimilitude: tragic and comic members o f this body are
not articulated, and the differences between them are not at all glossed
over, but pointed stressed” (Colie SLA 266-67).
Pointedly stressing differences and disputing truth serves in The Winter's Tale to
emphasize the paradox between the coexistence between truth and falsehood and
appearance and reality. The quick turn from the tragedy of Antigonus’ death to Perdita’s
new life seems to purposely bracket death and life.

The death of Mamillius and the

epiphany experienced by Leontes have the same effect. By locating such stark tragic and
comic circumstances so closely together, the audience is compelled to face their
conflicting emotions. The Winter’s Tale is, at once, two genres simply strung together as
Colie describes, but it also follows the intricacies of Beaumont and Fletcher’s typical
‘Tragie-comedie.”
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Life cycles occur over time and in the intervening period the human experience
happens where the ups and downs of life are more intertwined and less distinct. And, in
this experience, there are many episodes where truth and falsehood collide. The title of
the play, The Winter's Tale, implies that we can expect some level o f falsehood because
it is a tale, something that is imaginary, in doubt, or untrue. The Second Gentleman
validates this initial perception when he says: “This news, / which is called true, is so like
an old tale that the / verity of it is in strong suspicion” (V.ii.27-29). Paulina makes a
similar reference when she says that the story of Hermione’s secret existence “should be
hooted at / Like an old tale” (V.iii.l 16-17).

These references force the audience to

question the very play that they are experiencing if for no other reason than it has been
openly labeled as a tale. Lee Cox observes that, “Shakespeare is constantly reminding
the reader of the unbelievableness of a tale” (284). Mamillius’ observation that “A sad
tale’s best for winter” (II.i.25) will cue Leontes’ false accusation o f Hermione’s
unfaithfulness.

Shakespeare underscores that one cannot trust appearances by the

seemingly magical transformation of Hermione from stone to human.

The effect of

Hermione's apparent infidelity, her supposed death, and her seeming rebirth each serve to
stress the paradoxical relationship between appearance and reality.
Differences are evident from the start of the play when Archidamus says: “you
shall see, as I have said, great difference betwixt our Bohemia and your Sicilia” (Li.3-4),
referring to Polixenes and Leontes respectively.

In trying to persuade Polixenes to

remain in Sicilia, Hermione says: “How say you? / My prisoner? Or my guest” (I.ii.5455) and “Not your gaoler then, / But your kind hostess” (I.ii.59-60).

There is great

disparity between being a “prisoner” and a “guest” and between being a “gaoler” and
“hostess,” but whether you are one or the other is a matter of intent and perception. If
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Polixenes yields, he is a “guest” and Hermione his “hostess.” If not, then Polixenes will
have to stay in Sicilia anyway and be Hermione’s “prisoner” and she his “gaoler.”
Leonard Barkan makes an analogous argument regarding the relationship between
Paulina and Hermione during Hermione’s sixteen year absence: “Either Hermione died
and was resurrected in marble, or else she spent sixteen years in a garden-shed on the
grounds of her husband's palace, a solitude broken only by daily visits from her
protectress - or jailer?” (640). Difference may suggest distinction, but it does not have to
mean a lack of coexistence and we see this in the bond between the two kings. The
relationship between Leontes and Polixenes is based on a solid foundation that was
formed in their youth and continued into adulthood:
They were trained together in their childhoods, and there rooted betwixt
them then such an affection which cannot choose but branch now. Since
their more mature dignities and royal necessities made separation o f their
society, their encounters, though not personal, have been royally
attorneyed with interchange of gifts, letters, loving embassies, that they
have seemed to be together, though absent; shook hands, as over a vast;
and embraced, as it were, from the ends of opposed winds.

(I.i.22-31)

Though Leontes and Polixenes are different people and live apart, their long term mutual
affection flourishes because of their strong “rooted” bond despite their royal obligations
and physical separation.

In this instance, the appearance and the reality are rather

obvious, “that they have seemed to be together, though absent.”

This is in marked

contrast to Hermione stepping down from her pedestal where the line between
appearance and reality, or in that instance between art and nature, is much less certain.
Another example of the bridge that Shakespeare makes between the tragic and comic
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components of his tale is reflected in the image of the two kings shaking hands across a
physical divide functioning in the play much like the Old Shepherd’s link between life
and death. We see differences that, nonetheless, allow a cohesiveness that would not be
expected between opposites and which further underscores the paradox linking the two.
The key to their relationship, and the thing that allows them to overcome obstacles to that
relationship, is the “affection” that is “rooted betwixt them” because a strong foundation
is the base of all truth.

The relationship between Leontes and Polixenes survives,

ultimately, because of the strength of their rooted bond.
Key to the success of any relationship is the foundation upon which it is built.
Camillo recognizes the unstable basis of Leontes' misperception, “The fabric of his folly,
whose foundation / Is pil’d upon his faith, and will continue / The standing o f his body”
(I.ii.429-30), but he also understands that Leontes has “faith” in what he believes and that
it is therefore unshakable. Leontes’ error is in his belief, not in his conviction, and the
crises that follow his erroneous judgment demonstrate what happens when a “foundation”
is improperly set. And this appears to be a concept that Leontes understands, even before
he imprisons Hermione: “if I mistake / In those foundations which I build upon, / The
centre is not big enough to bear / A school-boy’s top” (II.i. 100-03).

He knows,

paradoxically, that false assumptions eventually will collapse under their own weight but,
since he has faith in what he believes, he is oblivious to the dangers of his own error.
Paulina sees “the root of his opinion, which is rotten / As ever oak or stone was sound”
(II.iii.89-90) as a “curse” (II.iii.87) that Leontes cannot be compelled to denounce
because he believes too strongly in what he thinks he has witnessed. Only the death of
Mamillius will jolt Leontes back to reason: “I have too much believ’d mine own
suspicion” (Ill.ii. 151), a “suspicion” that foreshadows the conclusion of the Second
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Gentleman regarding the “verity” of a tale.

The contact between Hermione and

Polixenes, observed by Leontes, may well have been “Too hot, too hot” (I.ii. 108) and
cause for his jealousy, but “suspicion” is something without proof and Leontes may well
have averted several disasters if he had relied upon the strength of his friendship with
Polixenes and trusted in his marriage to Hermione.

Having trust in a relationship or

marriage stems from an exchange of truth between these parties, and this is where
Leontes falters.
Leontes’ jealousy clouds his judgment so completely that he overtly contradicts
himself regarding the oracle, a presumed source of absolute truth. He correctly observes
that “circumstances / Made up to th’ deed, doth push on this proceeding” (ILi. 178-79)
and seeks “greater confirmation” (ILi. 180) of Hermione’s infidelity “from the Oracle”
(ILi. 185). Leontes seems to acknowledge that the proof he has relied upon is secondary
to the facts and that, rightly, he should obtain corroborating evidence. He tells Antigonus
that the counsel of the Oracle will either “stop or spur me” (ILi. 187) in Hermione’s
condemnation.

Yet, when the Oracle rules, “Hermione is chaste” (Ill.ii. 132), Leontes

declares, “There is no truth at all i’ th’ Oracle: / The sessions shall proceed: this is mere
falsehood” (Ill.ii. 140-41). The Oracle is a symbol o f truth, and there will be a price to
pay for ignoring its declarations. When the Servant tells Leontes that Mamillius is dead,
Leontes views his death as the vengeance of the gods: “Apollo’s angry, and the heavens
themselves / Do strike at my injustice” (Ill.ii. 146-47). Leontes has suffered loss based on
his mistaken trust in appearance. He will recover as he repents and begins to understand
his misplaced trust for, as James Siemon writes, “Loss has come through trusting too
readily in appearance, and recovery is accompanied by insistence that there is a truth
which lies behind appearance and which men ignore at their own peril” (12). One must
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wonder why the Oracle might extract its revenge on Leontes through the death of his son.
O f course, Mamillius’ death will penalize Leontes the most, but his death seems to serve
a larger purpose in the play. Peter Erickson thinks that “Mamillius and Antigonus are
sacrificed to exorcise Leontes’ wrath” (823). But, Mamillius is an innocent child, “Go
play, Mamillius; thou’rt an honest man” (I.ii.211), and “a gentleman of the greatest
promise” (Li.35-36). He is almost the perfect counter-character to Autolycus who is a
noted, and self-acknowledged, thief.

The death of Mamillius can imply that pure

innocence cannot survive on its own, that just a little bit of treachery in one’s character
can be useful. Camillo might just be the perfect example of this.
Leontes has a strong bond with Camillo, “I have trusted thee, Camillo, / With all
the nearest things to my heart” (I.ii.235-36), and he is undoubtedly a valued and honest
servant. But trust is a matter of convenience for Leontes, who, when Camillo objects to
Leontes’ charge against Hermione, turns on Camillo and says “thou art not honest...thou
art a coward” (I.ii.242-43), and accuses him o f being “negligent” and a “fool” (I.ii.247).
Camillo admits to some of these flaws in his character (I.ii.249-62), but argues: “these,
my lord, / Are such allow’d infirmities that honesty / Is never free o f ’ (I.ii.262-64). In
the short span of about five lines, Leontes has coupled trust with dishonesty, and it
compels the audience to consider the possibility that both characteristics can exist at the
same time within one person, that “allow’d infirmities” are a part of the human makeup.
Is this a resolution to the inherent human paradox that allows fact and fallacy to reside
together? The answer depends on who is asking that question. Camillo’s speech makes
us feel as if Shakespeare is telling us that no man is perfect, that there is simultaneous
strength and weakness of character in everyone, but in different proportions. Camillo’s
honest side will win out when he refuses to obey Leontes’ order to poison Polixenes
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(I.ii.356-59). His dilemma, defy Leontes and die or obey him and become a murderer,
leaves Camillo with no choice but to flee if he desires to stay true to himself. In the
process, Camillo proves Leontes right when he accused Camillo o f being “a hovering
temporizer that / Canst with thine eyes at once see good and evil, / Inclining to them
both” (I.ii.302-04). Camillo does know the difference between good and evil and he will
use the distance of time to extricate himself from his predicament. Camillo is a good
man who uses deception to avoid performing an evil act. He lies to Leontes when he tells
him that he will poison Polixenes and he will survive to play’s end for his masterful tact,
all the while remaining true to himself.
Antigonus is not as clever as Camillo, nor will he be as fortunate.

Leontes

challenges Antigonus’ conviction to save Perdita from being burned (Il.iii. 131 -33), “what
will you adventure / To save this brat’s life” (Il.iii. 161-62), to which he responds,
“Anything, my lord, / That my ability may undergo / And nobleness impose” (Il.iii. 16264).

Hearing this response, Leontes directs Antigonus to abandon Perdita to “some

remote and desert place...W here chance may nurse or end it” (Il.iii. 175-82).

Like

Camillo, Antigonus has been an honest and faithful servant whose loyalty is to be tested
by moral dilemma. Antigonus sees only two choices where Camillo, faced with a similar
dilemma, found three: dispose of Perdita as directed and condemn her to almost certain
death, but save Paulina and himself, or save Perdita and put his life and Paulina’s life in
jeopardy. Antigonus imagines no other alternative, such as running away or sacrificing
himself, that could have saved Perdita and Paulina. Up to this point, Shakespeare made
Camillo and Antigonus equal, both honest lords of Sicilia, loyal servants to their king,
and of similar kind nature, but he differentiates them by the choices each makes.
Hermione appears to Antigonus in a dream and tells him that he has gone “against thy
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better disposition” (III.iii.28) and for this “thou ne’er shalt see / Thy wife Paulina more”
(III.iii.35-36). Unlike Camillo, Antigonus chooses the less noble path, going against his
better judgment, and it is an error in judgment that will cost him his life: “I am gone for
ever” (III.iii.58). But his decision, like the decision Leontes makes earlier in the play, is
based on a weak foundation for, as he says to the infant Perdita, “That for thy mother’s
fault are thus exposed” (III.iii.50). Antigonus also assumes that Hermione was unfaithful
and, as a result, his destruction ensues. James Siemon concludes that, “Loss has come
through trusting too readily to appearance” (12) and this aptly applies to Leontes and
Antigonus. A comparison of Camillo and Antigonus demonstrates that appearances can
lead one down the wrong path and toward horrible consequences and, critically, that a
little larceny in the heart doesn’t hurt.
Camillo practices deception in an effort to do the correct thing, but Autolycus
uses it as a tool in his trade, that of a common thief. His father was Mercury, “god of
thieves, pickpockets, and all dishonest persons” (Pafford 82n25), so being a thief is in his
blood. And Autolycus knows who and what he is. The Clown wants to know “What
manner of fellow was he that robbed you” (IV.iii.83) and Autolycus, pretending to be a
victim of an unidentified road thief, identifies himself as a “rogue” (IV.iii.96) and indicts
himself by name, “Some call him Autolycus” (IV.iii.97) as if he were proud of his
identity.

To Lee Cox, this self-indictment mirrors Leontes’ self-induced crisis:

“However, in his guise as highway victim, Autolycus represents himself as robbed and
beaten by Autolycus, a comment that reminds us of the self-destructive nature of
Leontes’ wrong-doing and which precedes Leontes’ lament over the wrong he did
him self’ (288). O f course, the Clown knows the reputation o f Autolycus and describes
him as “Not a more cowardly rogue in all Bohemia” (IV.iii. 102), but Autolycus is
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unfazed by this characterization because it is confirmation to him that he is good at his
art. Norman Rabkin discusses this creativity in comparing Thomas Mann’s Felix Krull,
from The Confessions o f Felix Krull, with Shakespeare’s Autolycus when he says: “Both
rogues glory in an amoral mastery of the raw materials of life by force o f their artistry as
well as their outrageous yet delightful playing on the weaknesses o f all those who
become grist for the mill” (129). And Autolycus is an artist, but in the less popular sense.
Fie is a master artist of deception. He tells the Clown, still pretending to be someone else,
but referring to himself, “I cannot tell, good sir, for which of his virtues it was, but he was
certainly whipped out of court” (IV.iii.86-87). The Clown responds, as most logically
would, “His vices, you would say; there’s no virtue whipped out of the court” (IV.iii.8889). But what may have offended the court is what Autolycus characterizes as a “virtue”
and, hence, his statement, from his perspective, is accurate. To Autolycus, being a robber
is a virtue and part of his “artistry.” Being a master o f the false connects him to the
telling of a tale: “Tales are false” and Autolycus is “the practitioner in falsehood, the
dealer in tales. But the false tale masks truth” (Cox 284). His repertoire includes playing
the part of other people which he does innocently enough singing a ballad with Mopsa
and Dorcas: “I can bear my part; you must know ’tis my occupation” (IV.iv.296-97). He
naturally mocks honesty and trustworthiness, “Ha, ha! what a fool Honesty is! And Trust,
his sworn brother, a very simple gentleman” (IV.iv.596-98) and says that he stays
“constant to my profession” (IV.iv.683) when he conceals the truth about Florizel’s plans
for escape from King Polixenes. He later declares to the audience, out o f view from the
Clown and the Old Shepard, “Though I am not naturally honest, I am sometimes by
chance” (IV.iv.712-13).

By helping the Clown and the Old Shepard, Autolycus will

likely benefit personally, so his good deed merely occurs by chance, not by his natural
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inclination. If Autolycus is “not naturally honest,” then he is naturally dishonest and the
inverse of Mamillius. However, unlike Mamillius, Autolycus will survive because he is
an artisan who happens to specialize in the art o f deception and his constantly changing
appearance masks his true character. And yet, as Lee Cox notes, “In the face of seeming
pointlessness and paradox, of good working unnecessarily through evil, one is forced to
weigh the evil” (287). His continued presence reminds us that falsehood can coexist with
a little bit of honesty just as Camillo’s honesty can coexist with a little bit of his ability to
deceive.

These two extremes, honesty and deceit, coexist in Antigonus and Camillo;

however, it is the weak foundation of Antigonus which dooms him and the strong base of
Camillo which preserves him. Autolycus stays true to his character and Antigonus does
not and it is the reason that one survives and one does not. Honesty and falsehood exist,
paradoxically, inside each man.

Shakespeare shows that the characters of Mamillius,

Camillo, Antigonus and Autolycus are each naturally conflicted, that honesty and
falsehood cannot exist one without the other and that they are mutually dependent.
Shakespeare provides an obvious example of the difference between appearance
(falsehood) and reality (honesty) in the character of Autolycus, but other characters, in
addition to Camillo, selectively employ his art as well.

Leontes, while trying to trap

Hermione and Polixenes, in an aside says, “I am angling now, / Though you perceive me
not how I give line” (I.ii. 180-81). Paulina vows that Hermione is dead, “I say she’s dead:
I’ll swear it” (III.ii.203), which fools not only the characters o f the play, but the audience
as well. There can be a reward or a reckoning that accompanies the use o f deception and
that seems, in The Winter’s Tale, to depend on how it is being used, by whom, and
whether or not the intent is noble. Leontes’ “angling” only augments his earlier delusion
and ruins all his relationships, while costing Mamillius his life, before his reconciliation
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with Hermione and his reunion with Perdita. And that would not be possible if Paulina
had not lied about Hermione’s death and kept her secreted away for sixteen years. One
can argue that Leontes suffers for his deceit and errors in judgment but, because his intent
is not evil, forgiveness in tragicomedy allows absolution. Polixenes and Camillo will
attend the sheep-shearing festival in disguise (IV.ii.55) “not appearing what we are”
(IV.ii.48-49) in order to confirm what “angle...plucks our son thither” (IV.ii.47), and
therefore using an “angle” in order to determine an “angle.” Florizel will pretend to be
Camillo as part of his plan to affect his marriage to Perdita and reconcile Leontes and
Polixenes: “it shall be so my care / To have you royally appointed, as if / The scene you
play were mine” (IV.iv.592-94). Perdita’s “unusual weeds” (IV.iv.l) transform her from
shepherdess to queen of the sheep-shearing festival (IV.iv.2-5), a role in which she
reluctantly participates.

She also wonders how she would withstand the wrath of

Polixenes once the artifice of her relationship with Florizel is discovered: “Or how /
Should I, in these borrowed flaunts, behold / The sternness of his presence” (IV.iv.2224). After Polixenes removes his disguise (IV.iv.418sd) and reveals himself to Florizel,
Perdita’s fears are realized: “I told you what would come o f this: beseech you, / O f your
own stake take care: this dream of mine - / Being now awake, I’ll queen it no inch
further” (IV.iv.448-50). Perdita’s realization connects deception with dreaming. When
Polixenes takes off his disguise, he too moves from a world of make believe and reenters
the world of reality. If they are not in a dream-state, a world o f non-reality, then they
must be awake in the real, or natural, world.
Leontes, in his deluded state, comments to Camillo about the presumed deceit of
Hermione and Polixenes: “But we have been / Deceiv’d in thy integrity, deceiv’d / In that
which seems so” (I.ii.239-41). He was talking about Hermione’s infidelity, but because

Gilson 67

they were fooled by appearance, rather than seeing the reality, his observation reminds us
of the effect of observing art. Art presents an appearance created by the hand of man.
There are many definitions of the word art, but the one that is most relevant to our
discussion can be defined: “Human workmanship or agency; human skill as an agent.
Opposed to nature.” 10 Key to this definition is the differentiation between human agency
and nature and it reminds us of Rabkin’s permeability o f nature and art that is
exemplified in The Winter’s Tale by Hermione’s change from stone to human and where
art and nature course back and forth. Rabkin aptly describes Hermione’s transformation
as the “permeability of the barrier between art and life” (134).

Paulina’s audience

experiences shock and disbelief when they are confronted with a situation that cannot
exist. Stone does not turn to flesh and as Siemon notes, “The joy of Hermione’s recovery
is inseparable from the pain of her loss” (15). Just as Paulina deceived everyone with
Hermione’s “statue,” Shakespeare has deceived his audience with his art, the art of the
playwright and the illusion of the stage, crossing the boundary between make-believe and
actuality. The audience does not know that Hermione is alive until she steps down from
her pedestal. One intent of art can be to evoke an emotive response and we experience,
along with the characters of the play, the sensation of amazement and distrust because
what we have witnessed is a contraction between an appearance and the reality.
Paulina’s art gives us Hermione the statue, but it is nature that gives us Hermione the
being.
Nature plays a prominent role in The Winter’s Tale. Hermione’s pregnancy, the
creation of life, is at the heart of the play’s crisis and Leontes’ “diseas’d opinion”
(I.ii.297). And, when Paulina attempts to remove infant Perdita from her mother’s cell,

10

«

Art.” Def. 12a, Oxford English Dictionary Online, <www.oed.com>
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she persuades the Gaoler by invoking the enormity o f mother nature: “This child was
prisoner to the womb, and is / By law and the process of great nature, thence / Free’d and
enfranchis’d; not a party to / The anger of the king, nor guilty o f (If any be) the trespass
of the queen” (II.ii.59-63).

Perdita is, at once, the offspring of her mother and the

product of “great nature.” When Polixenes asks Perdita why she does not cultivate the
“streak’d gillyvors” (IV.iv.82), it sparks a debate in which Perdita acknowledges the
awesome power of nature and her reluctance to alter it: “For I have heard it said / There
is an art which, in their piedness, shares / With great creating nature” (IV.iv.86-88).
Polixenes takes issue with the idea that nature and art may be equivalent:
Yet nature is made better by no mean
But nature makes that mean; so, over that art.
Which you say adds to nature, is an art
That nature makes. You see, sweet maid, we marry
A gentler scion to the wildest stock,
And make conceive a bark of baser kind
By bud of nobler race. This is an art
Which does mend nature - change it rather - but
The art is itself nature.

(IV.iv.89-97)

In his view, nature is responsible for the creation o f everything including the art required
to modify the “streak'd gillyvors.” Said another way, nature is responsible for creating
the art that improves itself, that “The art is nature itself.” When the Second Gentleman
says that, “Julio Romano, who, had he himself eternity and could breath into his work,
beguile Nature of her custom, so perfectly he is her ape” (V.ii.96-99) he means that
Romano is so skilled in his art that he can do nature’s work for her. But Romano himself
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is a product of nature and if his skill “adds to nature,” then nature is responsible for his
talent just like the ability of Perdita’s unseen botanist shared with “great nature” in
crafting the “streak’d gillyvors.”
The sheep-shearing scene continues the play’s interrogation of art and nature.
The celebration seems to be a pastoral version of the more sophisticated court masque.
Most everyone is in disguise, there is music, and most invitees participate in dance. Joan
Hartwig writes, “The pastoral world seems to have at least as much sophistication in form
as the court, despite simpler, more basic experiences it celebrates. The debate on nature
and art comes appropriately into the focus of a scene which observes natural seasons in
artificial forms” (32). Nature gives man a platform to create art and man mimics nature
with that platform, but that imitation is also a part of nature and is what generates the
paradox between them. Sculptors and playwrights are artisans and imitators of life, but
parents, particularly women, are the ultimate artisans as they duplicate nature by
producing offspring, offspring that mirrors their creators. Paulina stresses the physical
similarities between Leontes and Perdita and nature’s helping hand in them: “Behold, my
lords, / Although the print be little, the whole matter / And a copy of the father...And
thou, good goddess Nature, which hast made / So like to him that got it” (II.iii.97-104).
And Leontes observes that Florizel is a perfect copy o f his father: “Your mother was
most true to wedlock, prince; / For she did print your royal father off, / Conceiving you”
(V.i.123-25). O f course, he notes the fidelity o f Florizel’s mother based on Florizel’s
likeness, but does not make the same leap of faith when it comes to his own wife and
daughter.
Paulina tells her audience that “It is requir’d / You do awake your faith” (V.iii.9495) before Hermione descends and it is Leontes turn to faith that reanimates her: “it is
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indeed Leontes’ faith that enables the statue o f Hermione to return to life” (Lim 319).
Looked at retrospectively, one can argue that it was Leontes lack of faith that took the life
out of her, that effectively turned her to stone. However, Shakespeare in this scene asks
his audience to do what he has warned them against: trust appearance. No one expects
Hermione to come back to life, but when she does we are ensnared in the liminal space
between humanity and humanity’s sculptured representation. What we have just seen
does not compute, yet it occurred right in front o f us. Barkan said that “Shakespeare
depended upon all those traditions which saw sculpture as both prime among the arts and
closest of all the arts to real life” (658) and it just may be that Shakespeare traverses the
boundary between nature and art to mirror the effect of conflicting qualities in humans.
Recall the inverse relationship between Autolycus and Camillo. One is more deceitful
than the next, and vice versa, but each on some level is simultaneously fraudulent and
honest.

Leontes said “we are mock’d with art” (V.iii.67) when Paulina first reveals

Hermione’s sculpture, but “If the statue was no statue, then it is life that mocks art”
(Barkan 663).

Either way, Paulina’s audience and the play’s attendees are surprised

when Hermione descends. No one anticipated such a shocking turn o f events, and the
scene is characterized by a sense of disbelief and curiosity that accompanied cabinets of
curiosity common in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Zytaruk 2). Platt describes
the paradox in the “singularities” (V.iii. 12) and “rarities” (V.iii.l2n) of Paulina’s gallery:
we witness an astonishing version o f the paradoxical blending o f nature
and art that is characteristic o f these cabinets. For we - along with the
other visitors - see a statue of Hermione, but one that miraculously seems
to have aged; she is and is not Hermione.

More paradoxical still, the

“dead” Hermione - at Paulina’s beckoning - steps from the pedestal into
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life....the play presents the naturalistic and the marvelous participating in
a tense, paradoxical dynamic, one that requires not the subordination of
one to the other, but rather an on-going dialectical exchange between the
two.

(200)

An artist may create a sculpture and a playwright a play, Autolycus may create the
perfect deception, and Perdita’s botanist may create the perfect hybrid, but each is a
creation of nature and, therefore, the real art is nature itself. Art is defined by its human
agency which, in turn, is a part of nature’s agency. Nature is the base, the root, the
foundation in the cycle of life to which all art harkens and, therefore, it is the seat of
repeating human truths. The Winter’s Tale privileges nature over art, but it also warns us
that we cannot always be sure which one we are observing at any given moment. The
effect of opposing binaries, Platt’s “dialectical exchange,” is to create teaching moments
since all of human existence is defined be the ongoing coexistence o f disparate parts.
Yet, these incompatible pieces, which are not always as they appear, cannot exist in
isolation one from the other.

The Tempest
The boundary between the real world and the world of fantasy continues to fade
in The Tempest.

And the exacting differences between binaries - Caliban (earth) and

Ariel (air), reason and emotion, or masque and antimasque, for example - become much
less certain to the point where one cannot be defined without the other. The marvelous
theatricality of Hermione’s transformation from stone to human is replicated multiple
times in The Tempest, but the movement between binaries is more fluid and not restricted
to one direction. In particular, there is interplay between the characters of the play and its
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audience that blurs the edge between the stage and the world outside. Such paradoxical
correspondence between the two posits that the short duration of the play is similar to the
brief interlude of a human life and that they share an equally evanescent quality.
Shakespeare fools Miranda and his audience. The play opens in a fierce storm
where life hangs in the balance with the ship’s crew and their royal passengers one step
away from drowning.

The drama is heightened by the argument between crew and

passengers, amongst “A tempestuous noise o f thunder and lightening heard” (I.i.sd) and
“A confused noise w ithin’ (I.i.60), that mirrors the chaos of the tempest while inverting
the inherent power structure between the two. On land, authority and power are seated
with Alonso, King of Naples, but at sea, the Shipmaster and Boatswain must have that
control, especially in a storm.

Sebastian and Antonio attempt to reassert the king’s

control at the height of danger and their incongruous focus in the face o f the storm
highlights their detachment from reality while simultaneously elevating the drama. But
Mother Nature is indifferent to the allocation of power among humans, as the Boatswain
says: “What cares these roarers for the name of king” (I.i.16-17).

The crew and

passengers are about to die in front of Shakespeare’s audience as the ship founders: “We
split, we split! - Farewell my wife and children! - Farewell brother! - / We split, we
split, we split” (I.i.60-62). Gonzalo’s repetition of “We split,” accompanied by the likely
urgency in the voice of the actor playing Gonzalo, puts us on edge and we might believe
we are watching a tragedy.

However, taunting death is a part of tragicomedy and

Shakespeare brings his audience back from the brink when Prospero informs Miranda,
hence his audience, “There’s no harm done” (I.ii.15). We thought that when we observed
Hermione’s statue that we were looking at art until Paulina and Shakespeare revealed the
truth to their respective audiences, audiences that are at once together, yet apart.
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Similarly, Prospero has used his art to trick Miranda just as Shakespeare has used his
playwright skill to manipulate his audience. The margin between drama and life begins
to get fuzzy and, if The Winter’s Tale exposes the boundary between nature and art, then
The Tempest explores the related permeability o f reality and the stage.
An island seems like an apt setting for The Tempest because it evokes an image of
a finite space quite similar to the confines and limitations of a stage, contributing to a
likeness between actor and audience. Mary Moore says that the island is “analogous to
the stage” (509). The sea between the island and the mainland is the liminal space that
connects one place to the next and, when someone crosses that liminal plain from a space
of certainty to one of uncertainty, he has exposed himself to a level o f disorder that can
transform him.

Regarding this exposure, Liebler says: “Whatever is undefined is

vulnerable; its identity is at stake because identity is a matter of definition and
boundary....Hence the importance o f liminality, the transitional time or condition in
which one, or a group, or a territory, or the season, is not what it was and not what it will
become, but something in between, something marginal, vague, and flexible” (117).11
Prospero left Milan a deposed ruler and arrived on the island thirsty for revenge, but he
leaves the island in control of Milan and Naples as a man whose reason and compassion
overcame his emotion and harshness. Prospero’s experience on the island changes him
and it will also change Miranda.

Miranda matures in the shadow o f the island’s

desolation under Prospero’s tutelage and protection. And, while the island is noteworthy
for its incubator-like role in fostering transformation, the appearance and function of the
island itself varies depending on whose perspective is being considered: “The ‘actuality’

11 Liebler’s Shakespeare’s Festive Tragedy, Chapter 4 - Communitas, Hierarchy, Liminality, Victimage
offers an in-depth discussion of liminality.
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of the island is always at a dream-like remove from the characters’ perceptions o f it.
Relativity of perception characterizes the court party, each o f whom has a decided
opinion on the climate and qualities of the island, and none of whom agree” (Magnusson
59). Gonzalo remarks, “How lush and lusty the grass looks! How green” (II.i.55), to
which Antonio responds, “The ground is indeed tawny” (II.i.56).

How can they be

looking at the same landscape and see two entirely different images? This is a paradox
rooted in contradictory perceptions, but in it there seems to be a correspondence between
virtue and perception. Gonzalo is “A noble Neapolitan” (I.ii.161) and sees the vitality of
the island, but Antonio’s perspective reflects his immorality as one who has usurped the
Milanese dukedom and set his brother and niece adrift to die.

Adrian’s paradoxical

description of the island embodies their conflicting opinions: “Though this island seems
to be a desert....Uninhabitable and almost inaccessible....It must needs be of subtle,
tender and delicate temperance....The air breathes upon us most sweetly” (II.i.37-49).
The journey of the audience to the theater and the transformation that takes place during
the play can have a similar effect.

People must travel between their homes and the

theater in order to attend a performance and that performance has the potential to change
an element of their lives.

If a play has been well thought out and staged, it has the

potential to return home an audience that may be different from the one that just shortly
before had arrived. Their journey to and from the theater, and any change the spectacle
may impart on their being, is impacted by crossing borders or moving beyond the edge o f
their normal existence. The paradoxical representations o f the play can provoke thinking.
Caliban is at home on the island.

He is a native and travels nowhere except

within the confines of its borders. Miranda is a transplant who does not travel either, but
the difference between her and Caliban is that she has been nurtured by Prospero for
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another, eventual existence that requires her to change. Caliban begins and ends the play
as a commodity, as a slave, and the only alterations in his persona are that he has learned
a language he does not value and he has become cynical and skeptical: “You taught me
language, and my profit on’t / Is I know how to curse. The red plague rid you / For
learning me your language” (I.ii.364-66).

Shakespeare paints him as an abused and

disgruntled being whose worth exists only in his ability to serve others. He attempted to
rape Miranda - “thou didst seek to violate / The honour of my child” (I.ii.348-49) - and
he is nothing more than a “thing of darkness” (V.i.275-76) to Prospero. It’s hard not to
side with Prospero, but maybe Caliban is more benign than represented. When Caliban’s
mother died, he was left to fend for himself as the only human-like being on the island
until Prospero and Miranda arrived (I.ii.281-84). What Prospero and Miranda interpreted
as an attempted rape could be construed as an action which followed a natural impulse to
mate. After all, Prospero worries about Miranda’s chastity when she first encounters
Ferdinand, “They are both in either’s powers, but this swift business / I must uneasy
make, lest the light winning / Make the prize light” (I.ii.451-53), and he warns Ferdinand
against acting on his natural impulse before the wedding ceremony (IV.i. 13.-23). On the
other hand, Caliban seems to have an understanding o f what would have happened had
his rape been successful: “O ho, O ho! Would’t had been done; / Thou didst prevent me, I
had peopled else / This isle with Calibans” (I.ii.350-52), but we cannot know his
motivating force. But Caliban’s disposition is deceptive and his natural impulses, with a
focus on nature that was typical of the late Renaissance,12 also let him see the poetic
beauty of the island:

12 For further reading on naturalism in the Renaissance see Charles B. Schmitt, ed., The Cambridge History
o f Renaissance Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1988: esp. 201-06).
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Be not afeard. The isle is full of noises,
Sounds and sweet airs that give delight and hurt not.
Sometimes a thousand twangling instruments
Will hum about mine ears; and sometimes voices,
That if I then had waked after long sleep,
Will make me sleep again; and then in dreaming,
The clouds, methought, would open and show riches
Ready to drop upon me, that when I waked
I cried to dream again.

(Ill.ii. 135-43)

While the island is home to Caliban, it is also a stage that enchants him. A play also can
be “full of noises” that “delight,” and include “twangling instruments” and “voices”
(dialogue), inducing its audience into a state of “dreaming.” Ferdinand and Miranda
experience the same sense of harmony and wonder when they first encounter each other.
Ferdinand says to Miranda, “O, you wonder” (I.ii.426) and Miranda is so enthralled by
Ferdinand that she can hardly contain herself: “I might call him / A thing divine, for
nothing natural / 1 ever saw so noble” (I.ii.418-20). Miranda is equally captivated when
she meets everyone else: “O wonder! / How many goodly creatures are there here! / How
beauteous mankind is! O brave new world / That has such people in’t” (V.i.181-84).
Their expressions mirror the reactions we might encounter while watching a play. We
will hear voices, we will be mesmerized and astonished, and we will be transported from
the reality of our seat into the fantasy of the stage.

And, if we especially enjoy the

performance, we will long for more. Caliban enjoyed the fantasy of the island before the
arrival of the interlopers shattered his dream. He, in effect, had done what Ferdinand
wished he could do: “Let me live here ever” (IV.i. 122). Shakespeare “does not even tell
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us if Caliban will remain alone on the island in freedom, or whether he is to accompany
Prospero to Milan” (Bloom 6). We do not know if Prospero takes Caliban off the island,
but if he did, Caliban cannot live in his dream forever either.
The island was given to Caliban by his mother and is taken from him by Prospero:
“This island’s mine by Sycorax, my mother, / Which thou tak’st from me” (I.ii.332-33).
The deposed has become the deposer. Prospero lost Milan to his brother Antonio and
Caliban has lost the island to Prospero: “Caliban’s original-and dynastic-claim to the
island remains undisputed; he is, like Prospero himself, a usurped ruler” (Pask Prospero’s
391). The odd circumstance is that Sycorax was banished from Algiers (I.ii.265) to the
island just as Prospero was banished from Milan. Prospero, the banished duke, also has
become usurper to the banished. The view one has of each character, and o f the power
each wields, depends entirely on which part o f the prism one looks into.

We can

sympathize with, or demonize, Prospero and Sycorax.
Caliban may have been master of the island when its population was one, but
there is no doubt that he is a slave to Prospero and Miranda. He is enslaved to Prospero
when The Tempest ends, but he will always be the natural master o f his island in a way
that Prospero cannot because Caliban is at home and Prospero is just an outsider. At first,
Caliban was taken with Prospero and Miranda, “I loved thee / And showed thee all the
qualities oTh’isle” (I.ii.337-38), and Miranda attempted to transform this “savage”
(I.ii.356): “I pitied thee, / Took pains to make thee speak, taught thee each hour / One
thing or other” (I.ii.354-56). But when Caliban attempted to rape Miranda, or mate with
her, he became an “Abhorred slave, / Which any print of goodness wilt not take, / Being
capable of all ill” (I.ii.352-54). This is the one time in The Tempest that Miranda shows
any sign of anger, but is not the only time that she will show emotion. O f course, she
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would be angry over his attempted rape, but she also seems discouraged that her teaching
and culture are meaningless to Caliban. He understood what she taught, but it was not in
his nature to accept those lessons and she abandons him: “But thy vile race / (Though
thou didst learn) had that in’t which good natures / Could not abide to be with” (I.ii.36061). Miranda denies the paradoxical coexistence of good and evil that this essay argues;
to her Caliban is “all ill” and there is no room within him for anything else. And she
penalizes Caliban for being different; to her, he is Stephano’s “m ooncalf’ (II.ii.105) and
Prospero’s “thing of darkness” (V.i.275), nothing positive.
Whether Caliban is a slave, “mooncalf,” “thing o f darkness,” a naïve servant to
Stephano, or the poetic being who paints the island with his verse, he also seems to exist
in the play in contrast to Ariel. He is “Thou earth” (I.ii.315) to Ariel’s “spirit” (I.ii.193),
substance to the immaterial, and body to soul. Yet they are both slaves. Ariel was a
slave to Sycorax and is in servitude to Prospero. Shakespeare imparts a level o f goodness
to Ariel that he does not grant Caliban. Ariel “wast a spirit too delicate / To act her
earthy and abhorred commands” (I.ii.272-73). The use o f “earthy” elevates Ariel at the
expense of Caliban even though in his rage Prospero refers to Ariel in Caliban-like
fashion as a “malignant thing” (I.ii.257).

Shakespeare presents a dark Caliban and a

whimsical Ariel but, if we look closer, we might just stretch our imagination and believe
that the appearance and the reality are inverted. Inversion by itself is not necessarily
paradoxical, but it is if we can see contradictory traits within the same character. What
bad deed has Caliban enacted?

Shakespeare constructed a semi-human character that

automatically cast him as an outsider and who is mistreated by everyone. Perhaps it is a
comment on the dark side of slavery? The rape incident is debatable and he may have
intended to murder Prospero, neither of which actually occurs. He performs his slave
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duties and tries to improve his life by courting a benevolent master. Ariel, on the other
hand, helps Prospero position his enemies for revenge: “My high charms work, / And
these, mine enemies, are all knit up / In their distractions. They are now in my power”
(III.iii.88-90). Prospero certainly practices “rough magic” (V.i.50) and Ariel is big part
of his magical repertoire.

We learn that Arial was responsible for the terror that the

shipmates felt before their vessel burned and sank (I.ii. 195-206). He spooks Ferdinand
with his “invisible, playing and singing” (I.ii.375sd), and when Prospero stages his
imaginary banquet, Ariel enters “like a harpy, claps his wings upon the table, and with
quaint device the banquet vanishes” (III.iii.52sd), completely intimidating the “three men
of sin” (III.iii.53). Together, Prospero and Ariel will frighten Stephano, Trinculo and
Caliban: “A noise o f hunters heard. Enter diverse Spirits in shape o f dog and hounds,
hunting them about, Prospero and Ariel setting them on” (IV.i.254sd). Ariel scares and
manipulates people, which is in contrast to Caliban who merely seeks a simple existence.
Both arguments have merit and there is no right or wrong answer, just provocation of
thought. Platt wrote that “paradoxes...were meant to instruct by means of going contrary
to received wisdom or knowledge” (202) and by considering multiple versions of Caliban
and Ariel, we may come to a new realization about human nature. We are not asked to
draw a conclusion, and Shakespeare does not offer one, but we are positioned to
interrogate what we are seeing.
Prospero is like a play director in that he directs the movement of Ariel; Ariel’s
actions contain a sense of theatricality. He seems particularly aware of his showmanship
as he “flamed amazement” (I.ii. 198) aboard the ship and we begin to realize that we are
witness, in concert with the play’s actors, to a series of spectacles within the play. The
foundering ship helped Prospero*s plan, “Now does my project gather to a head” (V .i.l),
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but it was staged by Prospero for the benefit of Miranda and the people on board. It was
also staged for the play’s audience. In the same way, the “playing and singing” were
meant to entice Ferdinand and the vanishing banquet was meant to torment Alonso,
Sebastian, and Antonio.

These are scenes o f Prospero’s drama as well as in

Shakespeare’s play, blurring the boundary between dream and reality.

Hermione’s

descent taught us that we cannot always trust appearance and Prospero’s art is his ability
to manipulate, sway, and cause uncertainty. We do not know in the beginning of The
Tempest that the storm is under the control of a sorcerer and that the people on the ship
are never really in danger even though Shakespeare has taught us to be alert, to not be
sucked into the performance. Miranda knows this because she has seen her father’s act
before: “If by your art, my dearest father, you have / Put the wild waters in this roar, allay
them” (I.ii.1-2). Prospero’s art released Ariel from his pine prison (I.ii.291-93) and it
was his art that brings Ferdinand and Miranda together (I.ii.420-21). An astute observer
might have concluded at the beginning of the play that Prospero was near the end of his
project when he tells Miranda, “Be collected; / No more amazement” (I.ii. 13-14), because
if the surprise has ended, so then has the play. The use of the word “amazement” by
Prospero and Ariel, combined with the meaning o f Miranda’s name, an expression of
wonder, should draw one to the realization that they are immersed in a spectacle about
playing.

Shakespeare dazzles his audience the way that Prospero engages his, by

authoring drama. Prospero’s purpose, his “project,” is clear. He wants revenge, he wants
to marry his daughter, and he wants to “please” (Epilogue 13). Magnusson says: “While
the goal of his ‘project’ is never explicitly stated and remains somewhat obscure, it surely
involves the recovery of his dukedom, peace with Naples, and provision both for the
future of his daughter and for the future of the two kingdoms” (59).

What is
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Shakespeare’s project?

We will never know.

But Prospero’s last aim, to please, is

suspect because he is talking directly to the audience. He is both in character and out of
the play. He is on the stage, but in dialogue with the audience. The audience, in turn, is
witness to Prospero’s show, but in dialogue with an actor. One does not exist without the
other. Where is the divide between the stage and audience, between audience and stage?
The dynamic, two-way paradoxical exchange between stage and audience, audience and
stage, is in full view. Art imitates life and vice versa.
Shakespeare appears to have used a form of the Jonsonian masque in The Tempest
to continue the dissolve between observers and observed, while upsetting the order of the
traditional masque so that the chaotic element o f the masque is not overcome.

In

“Caliban’s Masque,” Kevin Pask speculates on the interplay between Shakespeare and
Ben Johnson: “At about the time of The Tempest...Jonson was using the masque as a
form of commentary on Shakespearean theater, making it more likely that Shakespeare
was engaged in using the public theater as a form o f commentary on the Jonsonian
masque” (747).

Ben Jonson’s court masques were a noted form of Jacobean

entertainment that blurred the edge between actor and observer, incorporating competing
elements of disorder and authority, with the authority o f the court always reaffirmed. A
key component to the masque was the interaction near the end where the actors and
attendees danced together on stage, softening the line between the two. Orgel writes:
“The end toward which the masque moved was to destroy any sense o f theater and to
include the whole court in the mimesis - in a sense, what the spectator watched
ultimately he became” (.Jonsonian Masque 6-7). Lesley Mickel says that the masque
“was created for an aristocratic elite of courtiers who were directly involved with it, both
as masquers and as participants in the revels at the end o f the entertainment” (1).
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Caliban’s “foul conspiracy” (IV.i. 139) interrupts the joyful conclusion o f the wedding
masque, upsetting the expected order of the entertainment in which an antimasque
precedes the masque proper.

In this instance, the negative memory of Caliban, the

antimasque, upsets the intended joyful ending of Prospero’s “present fancies” (IV.i. 122),
the masque, rather than the other way around. According to Mickel, “‘Masque’ refers to
the Court entertainment as a whole, but it is also used to describe a constituent part.
Critics also refer to the ‘masque’ when alluding to the courtly component o f the court
entertainment, which was often prefaced by an ‘antimasque’” (24nl). An audience o f the
time would have expected to see the antimasque handily vanquished by the positive
elements of the masque because, as Ernest Gilman notes, “their order remains constant”
(215). Gilman describes the form and function of the masque and antimasque:
Typically, in the Jonsonian structure o f the contemporary masque, the
raucous antimasquers pose an initial threat to the orderly celebration of the
main masque; they and their indecorous commedia dell’arte antics must be
vanquished before the revels can proceed. The kind o f threat posed, and
the (usually effortless) way it is dispensed with, enhance the serene
triumph of the virtues made visible in the end.

By its temporary

opposition to the revels, the antimasque offers contrast between a fleeting,
hollow,

misshapen

world

of

noisy

but

ultimately

insubstantial

appearances, and an ideal world of harmonious and enduring value. (215)
By reversing the order of contrasting elements, an antimasque and masque that exist
within the confines of a single court entertainment, Shakespeare does not affirm the
authority of the court.

Instead, he allows the chaos, in this instance Caliban’s “foul

conspiracy,” to contradict the merry ending o f the wedding revels. The antimasque in

Gilson 83

this case is not so fleeting. Mickel is not referring specifically to The Tempest when she
says that the “masque enables a dialectical exploration o f the nature of royal authority”
(16), but her comment applies because, by subverting authority, we are questioning
authority. Gilman interprets the interrupted masque as having a retrospective, learning
function:
At the moment of its disruption we are dislocated, dislodged from the
illusion of the masque. The unexpected antimasque jars us into realizing
that we can’t live here ever; it deprives us for the moment o f our sense of
ending, and reopens the scene to perils that demand a new urgency of
purpose and the will to act.

We re-place our hypothetical view o f the

revels-as-culmination with a revised understanding of the revels-asprologue to a movement as yet unfinished....we direct our energies
forward by going backward: hindsight provokes foresight.

(226-27)

The paradoxical nature of the masque form, and in particular the interrupted masque of
The Tempest, is a good example o f contrary, coexistent entities that provoke thinking
beyond the borders of accepted thought.

As Platt said, “paradoxes...were meant to

instruct by means of going contrary to received wisdom or knowledge” (202). And by
vacillating back and forth between past and present, “past” can be “prologue” (II.i.253).
The sudden stoppage of the revels also serves to amaze the audience, unnerve them,
keeping them alert because Prospero’s project is not yet complete. It also creates a sense
of tension in a play that is not supposed to surprise because we know that Prospero is in
control of everything. But the interruption tells us that control can be transitory and that
uncertainty does play a role in every life.

In the neat and tidy world o f a Jonsonian

masque we are safe, but when Shakespeare interrupts that world, he shows us the illusion
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of the masque. Once again, we are asked to discern between appearance and reality with
the understanding that the difference between the two is not always distinct.
One of the main purposes of a masque was to keep in power those in power, but
the masque is a fantasy because real life does not function that way. The cycle o f life is a
series of ups and downs, a recurring sequence of antimasque-masque. Glynne Wickham
discusses the sequence of the vanishing banquet (III.iii.52sd) and the interrupted masque
(IV.i.l38sd), two antimasque elements, “Instead of being left to consider each of these
visual diversions singly and in isolation, we were invited to view them in conjunction,
one as the sequel of the other” (3), but the notion of undulating opposites is clear. The
Tempest shows this.

Even before the play begins, Prospero has been usurped and

banished (I.ii. 120-51), a facet of disorder. The wedding of Alonso’s daughter Claribel
(II.i.70-72) represents order, and this happy occasion is followed by the tempest that
maroons the crew, a representation of disorder. The trials of Alonso and his crew, the
fight that Ferdinand must entertain in order to win Miranda, and even Prospero’s (at
times) unstable execution of his project are part of the detailed interplay between order
and disorder.

The Tempest ends with the typical reunion and reconciliation of

tragicomedy and the promise of a wedding celebration leaves behind prior trials,
interruptions and disturbances.

But there are shadows o f antimasque on the horizon.

Caliban’s future is undetermined and he is still a slave, Prospero and Alonso and their
contingents must travel from the island, and the union of Ferdinand and Miranda is
untested.
Shakespeare makes it clear in the revels speech that our lives can be ephemeral
like a play: “We are such stuff / As dreams are made on, and our little life / Is rounded
with a sleep” (IV.i. 156-58), making the line between fact and fiction even harder to
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define. Plays last but a short time as they present snippets of being and, likewise, the
lifetime of an individual is but a moment in the span of human existence. Each is finite.
There is an element of resignation in Prospero’s voice following the revels speech: “Say
again, where didst thou leave these varlets” (IV.i.170), forgetting all about the “foul
conspiracy” of Caliban, Stephano and Trinculo just 30 lines after being disturbed by
them. Prospero has reached the crescendo o f his performance: “At this hour / Lies at my
mercy all mine enemies” (IV.i.262-63) and “Now does my project gather to a head. / My
charms crack not; my spirits obey; and time / Goes upright with his carriage” (V.i.1-3).
The “sleep” (IV.i.158) of the revels is near for Prospero and “time” will shortly end his
personal drama. Prospero is beginning to peer beyond his plan for revenge and he seems
uncertain as to what is next. His attention is straying and his drive ebbing: “Say, my
spirit, / How fares the King and’s followers” (V.i.6-7).

Ariel tells Prospero that his

“charms so strongly works ‘em / That, if you now beheld them, your affections / Would
become tender” (V.i.17-19), and it is in this moment that his reason overtakes his
emotion: “Though with their high wrongs I am struck to th’ quick, / Yet with my nobler
reason ‘gainst my fury/ Do I take part” (V.i.25-27) and he realizes that “The rarer action
is / In virtue than in vengeance” (V.i.27-28).

Prospero, paradoxically, has grabbed

substance out of nothing. He has converted the airiness of emotion with the help Ariel,
“thou, which art but air” (V.i.21), into the substance of reason that manifests itself in the
release of his “enemies.”
Miranda makes the reverse leap from reason to emotion when playing chess with
Ferdinand. She uses her intellect to discern that Ferdinand may be cheating, “Sweet lord,
you play me false” (V.i. 172), an expected element of the traditional, disordered game of
chess: “The broader tradition contains not only kings and courts, but cheating, betting,
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beating, fighting, class conflict, civil unrest, and seduction” (Poole 53). William Poole
observes that “Shakespeare seems to have privileged the military, oppositional dimension
of the game, not its air of courtly relaxation” (55) which, along with his preceding
description regarding the disorderly nature of chess, is an antimasque argument imbedded
within reunion and reconciliation.

But Miranda immediately allows her emotion to

override her reason when Ferdinand denies her assertion and she responds with: “Yes, for
a score of kingdoms you should wrangle, / And I would call it fair play” (V.i.175). Even
though he may be cheating, an act that a rational person might object to, she endorses his
falseness. The emotion of her love for Ferdinand now rules. Margaret Jones-Davies
equates the true-false interplay between Ferdinand and Miranda to the chessboard before
them: “The false and the true become mixed up on this chessboard, one substituting for
the other like equivalent pawns following the diagonals of a chiasmus” (qtd. Poole 58).
Indeed, the checkerboard surface of a chess board serves as a visual metaphor for life’s
necessary contrasting opposites. The chess board is comprised of contrasting colored
squares and the game of chess cannot be played without this opposition for, without it,
there is no game. Each square of the chess board, embedded in a checkerboard pattern,
represents a myriad number of strategic moves in any given match. Individual positions
are won or lost based on the soundness of strategy. Every match will have a triumphant
and a conquered (unless it’s a draw), but the strategy deployed in each set will always
vary, making the journey of the contest all important. When the outcome of the contest is
determined, the board and all its pieces are reset and the game begins anew. Pending a
draw, someone will always win and another will always lose, that is always certain, but
the rhythm of the game continues in perpetuity and there is no one contest that is played
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like another. Key to the checkerboard, then, are the contrasting squares, each infinite in
their representation, but none which exists without its adjacent other.
Paradoxical binaries have been a steady trope of The Tempest and we can see that
a play does not exist without an audience and that an audience does not exist unless there
is a play. In the Epilogue, Prospero embodies both positions and so does the theatergoer:
“He speaks at precisely the moment in the play when we too are midway between our
own world and the world of the theater” (Kirsch 349).

But the interplay between

character and audience is a Shakespearean commonplace, especially in the comedies.
Prospero’s address to the audience brings the spectators into the world o f his stage and he
to their position, mirroring the action of the end of a masque. The edge between the two
is lost and Prospero and listeners are located in the liminal space between the two worlds
experiencing a dialectical exchange. But if Ferdinand cannot live “here ever” (IV.i.127),
neither can Prospero or his audience. Prospero was master to Caliban, Ariel and, through
his “art,” everyone else in the play, but now he finds himself in the role o f slave begging
for “release” (Epilogue 9). He ends up immersed in a paradox of his own creation. His
project as sorcerer during The Tempest essentially was to assure his royal lineage and
now, as an actor who has exhausted his performance, his project is “to please” (Epilogue
13). He is “confined” (Epilogue 4) onstage and only through the “indulgence” (Epilogue
20) of his viewers, the ones who made him possible in the first place, can set him free.
From the perspective of the audience, we must realize that what we have just seen is an
illusion, an evanescent existence.

We too must depart the theater, but we are more

skeptical now in how we discern appearance and reality. The fantasy and the short term
nature of drama mirrors and imitates our brief stint of life, bringing the two together and
acknowledging their codependent existence.
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CONCLUSION
All plays express human drama at some level.

Tragicomedy combines the

seriousness of tragedy with the whimsy of comedy and urges temperance between the
two. The contestation of social and political issues, ignited by the crisis of the play, is
resolved through their reorganization and regeneration; and there is always optimism at
the end of Shakespeare’s four romances. In tragicomedy, the tragic circumstances are
never fatal and the mirth is never excessively celebratory, making the tragicomic form the
balance between tragedy and comedy. As a result, tragicomedy’s modulation is more
reflective of our existence.

Tragicomedy’s protean quality is also fertile ground for

paradox. Shakespeare’s four tragicomedies use paradox to interrogate contradictions that
define the human experience. That human experience is predicated on our identity.
The plays were analyzed in the order of their publication and also because there
seemed to be a progression from one to the next. A rough pattern emerged. We discuss
in Pericles the value of history to the present and it shows that our heritage and
background are the foundation of our identity. Cymbeline demonstrates the many ways
that identity is influenced - through words, reasoning, dress, and the passage o f time, to
name a few - and how it is not fixed. The Winter’s Tale and Hermione’s transition warn
us that the appearance of that identity can be manipulated. And we see in The Tempest
that, to some extent, each of us changes our own identities to suit our present purpose,
paradoxically making us all actors in real life.
Binary relationships are the location of paradox. Pericles defines the present by
looking to the past, places providence and free will in the same discussion, and suggests
that women empower men. There are many forces that define identity in Cymbeline and
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they are centered on Posthumus, who is at once British and Roman, and Imogen, who is
simultaneously a court princess and a pastoral, male Fidele. Hermione is a statue and a
human being in The Winter’s Tale making her a product of man and nature at the same
time.

In The Tempest, the character of Prospero reflects how our identities vacillate

between being an actor and being a receiver of play acting.
Pericles, Cymbeline, The Winter ’s Tale, and The Tempest each put us in dialogue
with paradox, that space of coexistent contraries. We travel from one binary to the next,
altering our perspectives, riding a tumultuous liminal wave until each of us makes a
decision based on what we have learned by examining paradox. The value of paradoxes
in Shakespeare’s four tragicomedies is that they challenge positions, forge boundaries,
and evoke thought. They do not dictate. It is the audience’s job to make a judgment
from the cycling, ever-changing, and unstable world of uncertainty, of human existence,
to always recalibrate and move forward toward the never-ending chain o f paradoxes.
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